Joint sub-carrier and power allocation for efficient communication of cellular UAVs.

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Hellaoui, H., Bagaa, M., Chelli, A. et Taleb, T. (2020). Joint sub-carrier and power allocation for efficient communication of cellular UAVs. IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications, 19 (12). pp. 8287-8302. ISSN 1558-2248 DOI 10.1109/TWC.2020.3021252

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Résumé

Cellular networks are expected to be the main communication infrastructure to support the expanding applications of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). As these networks are deployed to serve ground User Equipment (UEs), several issues need to be addressed to enhance cellular UAVs' services. In this article, we propose a realistic communication model on the downlink, and we show that the Quality of Service (QoS) for the users is affected by the number of interfering BSs and the impact they cause. The joint problem of sub-carrier and power allocation is therefore addressed. Given its complexity, which is known to be NP-hard, we introduce a solution based on game theory. First, we argue that separating between UAVs and UEs in terms of the assigned sub-carriers reduces the interference impact on the users. This is materialized through a matching game. Moreover, in order to boost the partition, we propose a coalitional game that considers the outcome of the first one and enables users to change their coalitions and enhance their QoS. Furthermore, a power optimization solution is introduced, which is considered in the two games. Performance evaluations are conducted, and the obtained results demonstrate the effectiveness of the propositions.

Type de document: Article
Mots-clés libres: Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) Downlink communication Cellular networks Game theory
Date de dépôt: 14 janv. 2026 15:10
Dernière modification: 14 janv. 2026 15:10
Version du document déposé: Post-print (version corrigée et acceptée)
URI: https://depot-e.uqtr.ca/id/eprint/12485

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