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NEWSPAPER COVERAGE OF THE FLQ CRISIS BY  
*LA PRESSE* AND THE *TORONTO DAILY STAR*:

A study of Opinions on Canadian Democracy

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# NEWSPAPER COVERAGE OF THE FLQ CRISIS BY *LA PRESSE* AND *THE TORONTO DAILY STAR*: A STUDY OF OPINIONS ON CANADIAN DEMOCRACY

## ABSTRACT

This study compares and examines opinions on democracy in Canada as expressed in two daily newspapers of wide circulation : *The Toronto Daily Star* and *La Presse*, at the time of the political crisis provoked by the Front de Libération du Québec. The first chapter calls to mind the political context of the 1960s in Quebec, the tension between Quebec nationalism and Canadian federalism, the role of the media, and the effect of ownership concentration on the fashioning of public opinion. The following chapter presents the principal dimensions of democracy, and explores the specific characteristics of democracy in Canada and in Quebec. The final chapter puts forward an analysis of editorials, letters to the editor and opinion articles written by various "intellectuals" which appeared in the *Star* and *La Presse* during the month of October 1970. The main findings reveal different representations, conveyed through the two large dailies, of the aspects of democracy and of the role of state at the time of this major political crisis in Canada.

## RÉSUMÉ

### **LA COUVERTURE DE LA CRISE D'OCTOBRE 1970 EXAMINÉE DANS *LA PRESSE* ET *THE TORONTO DAILY STAR* : une analyse d'opinion sur la démocratie canadienne**

Ce mémoire a pour objet d'examiner et de comparer les opinions sur la démocratie au Canada exprimées dans deux grands quotidiens, *The Toronto Daily Star* et *La Presse*, lors de la crise politique provoquée en octobre 1970 par Le Front de libération du Québec (FLQ). Sous la Loi des mesures de guerre, la réponse des gouvernements aux actions terroristes a été d'octroyer aux corps policiers et à l'armée le pouvoir d'user de tous les moyens jugés nécessaires pour maintenir l'ordre. La presse a été bâillonnée et des centaines de personnes ont été arrêtées et détenues arbitrairement. Pendant ces jours, les libertés démocratiques les plus fondamentales ont été suspendues.

Cette étude vise à dégager les opinions de la presse à grand tirage sur la portée de la crise d'octobre pour la vie démocratique au Canada. Pour rendre raison des opinions des deux grands groupes linguistiques au pays, deux quotidiens, l'un basé à Montréal et l'autre à Toronto, ont été choisis : *La Presse* et *The Toronto Daily Star*. Ces quotidiens partagent plusieurs traits communs : gros tirage, public diversifié, prédominance de la nouvelle, propriété de l'entreprise par le grand capital, localisation dans deux grandes villes. Nonobstant ces ressemblances, l'objet de l'étude est de comparer la couverture de la crise par les deux grands quotidiens en procédant à une analyse des prises de position des éditorialistes, des lecteurs et des « intellectuels »

durant le mois d'octobre 1970. Étant donné que la scène des événements se déroulait essentiellement au Québec, et dans la région de Montréal en particulier, nous nous demanderons si leur localisation n'influencait pas les opinions exprimés dans les deux journaux.

Le premier chapitre rappelle d'abord le contexte politique des années 1960 au Québec, les tensions entre le nationalisme québécois et le fédéralisme canadien. Cette polarisation s'est cristallisée autour de deux personnages politiques, chacun à leur manière, exceptionnels : Pierre-Elliott Trudeau et René Lévesque. Deux conceptions de la nation, des droits individuels et des droits collectifs se sont affrontées sur la place publique. Pendant que René Lévesque et Pierre-Elliott Trudeau débattaient encore démocratiquement de leur option respective, Pierre Vallières, alors membre du FLQ, proposait la voie révolutionnaire pour changer la société et faire l'indépendance du Québec. Ce premier chapitre explore aussi le rôle des médias et de la concentration de l'information dans la formation de l'opinion publique. Au Québec, comme au Canada, les médias écrits appartiennent ou sont contrôlés en large partie par de grandes entreprises de presse, alors que les médias électroniques vivent sous un régime mixte (entreprise/État). La propriété des journaux par le grand capital a constamment soulevé la question du droit du public à une information objective. Certains ont soutenu que la crise d'octobre était, entre autres, une lutte pour le contrôle temporaire de l'information au Québec. Daniel Latouche, pour sa part, reconnaît que l'objectif des enlèvements était plus large que de procurer de la publicité pour l'organisation du FLQ. Il y voit une stratégie d'utilisation des médias pour communiquer directement avec l'ensemble de la population. La Loi des mesures de guerre a interrompu de façon drastique ce stratagème en suspendant la liberté de presse.

La crise d'octobre a constitué, du moins nous en faisons une hypothèse générale que nous tenterons d'étayer, un test pour les valeurs et les institutions démocratiques au Canada. Aussi le second chapitre est-il consacré à préciser les grands enjeux de la démocratie dans les sociétés occidentales : le contrôle populaire, l'égalité politique, les libertés civiques et politiques, la règle de la majorité et la légitimité de l'État. La crise d'octobre a-t-elle remis en cause les assises de la démocratie au Canada et au Québec ? Thomas Berger soutient, pour sa part, qu'elle a mis à rude épreuve le système démocratique, qu'elle a constitué « La fin de l'innocence canadienne ». Ce dernier accuse Trudeau et ses conseillers d'avoir proclamé la loi des mesures de guerre sans raison suffisante. Ils ont justifié ces mesures en prétextant que les actions du FLQ ne respectaient pas le procès démocratique normal et partant, qu'elles appelaient l'utilisation légitime par l'État de la force physique pour maintenir l'ordre établi. Mais les vraies questions ne sont-elles pas les suivantes : quelles sont les limites raisonnables de la dissidence ? Est-ce que le FLQ menaçait réellement l'ordre social au Canada pour justifier l'intervention de l'armée ? Est-ce que l'action répressive de l'État n'a-t-elle pas été commandée par le gouvernement en place pour des raisons proprement partisans ?

Enfin, le troisième et dernier chapitre est consacré à l'analyse des éditoriaux, des lettres des lecteurs et des points de vue de divers « intellectuels » parus dans le *Star* et *La Presse* au cours du mois d'octobre 1970. Dans le prolongement des questionnements sur la démocratie élaborés dans le chapitre précédent, une grille d'analyse des opinions, divisée en trois grandes catégories (opinions sur la démocratie, le rôle de l'État et sur les causes de la crise), comprenant chacune des dimensions et des indicateurs, a été mise au point de manière à permettre une interprétation nuancée des prises de position exprimées dans les deux grands quotidiens. L'analyse révèle des représentations différentes, véhiculées par les deux journaux, sur des aspects de la

démocratie et sur le rôle de l'État lors de cette crise politique majeure au Canada. Contrairement à l'idée de départ, le quotidien torontois a manifesté généralement des prises de position à la fois plus libérales sur la démocratie et plus critiques sur les actions du gouvernement fédéral que le quotidien *La Presse*. L'opposition à la suspension des libertés civiles et le désir de voir le gouvernement négocier avec le FLQ pour sauver la vie des otages étaient prédominants dans la couverture du *Toronto Daily Star*. Pour sa part, *La Presse* était davantage enclin à appuyer les actions policières et militaires et à mettre l'accent sur le maintien de la loi et de l'ordre.

Il est à noter que très peu d'articles rédigés par des intellectuels, à savoir historiens, politologues, anthropologues ou sociologues, ont paru dans le journal *La Presse* durant cette période. Les intellectuels ont privilégié le journal indépendant *Le Devoir* pour exprimer leurs points de vue, le plus souvent dissidents, plutôt que le journal de Paul Desmarais, jugé fédéraliste et plus conservateur. Lors de cette crise politique, l'espace critique au Québec a été principalement occupé par *Le Devoir*.

Enfin, cette étude suggère que la couverture par les deux grands quotidiens des événements d'octobre 1970 a contribué à influencer les opinions de leur public respectif sur la démocratie et sur le rôle de l'État en situation de crise. En effet, les deux journaux ont présenté différemment les événements et leurs lecteurs respectifs ont aussi réagi distinctement, notamment sur la question centrale de la suspension des droits et libertés. Est-ce à dire que la comparaison de la couverture d'un événement tout autre conduirait aux mêmes résultats ?



## PREFACE

For one with the great privilege of alternately living in the provinces of Ontario and Québec, occasions for comparison are constantly arising. Even day-to-day happenings, such as the reading of the morning paper, can remind one of difference between neighbours. Subscribing to both a Toronto and a Montreal newspaper, one can become fascinated by what appears to be different accounts of the same events, and different slants and interpretations of issues. This observation fed the idea of a comparative content analysis of an English-language Toronto newspaper and a French-language Montreal newspaper. With the help and guidance of my director of research, M. Roger Levasseur, and important feedback and information from M. Normand Séguin and other professors and peers at *l'Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières*, the idea grew into the present project.

## INTRODUCTION

This study deals with the comparison of political opinion found in two daily newspapers of high circulation : *The Toronto Daily Star*<sup>1</sup> of Toronto and *La Presse* of Montreal. The main problem which the study seeks to examine is whether these two popular dailies disseminate different views of the democratic system in Canada to their respective audiences.

The event chosen as a means of conducting the comparative analysis is one of great political significance : the Canadian emergency in 1970, the FLQ crisis<sup>2</sup>. Much research has explored the impact of crisis situations on political systems and media operations, and it is often repeated that an effective way to get a meaningful view of political communications is to observe their handling at a time of crisis. Summarizing the research on the term "crisis", author Daniel Latouche states that the word is used to define a situation when the following elements are present :

a) a *threat* which is recognized as such by the actors, and which imperils the organizational status quo or the stability of the interactive relationship between actors; (b) a restricted period of *time* during which the decision-making agents must formulate and implement a response to the threat; (c) an element of *surprise* which modifies the definition of the situation; (d) an escalating level of *risks* or of a breakdown in the political system<sup>3</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> *The Toronto Star*, as it is named today, was under the name of *The Toronto Daily Star* in 1970.

<sup>2</sup> FLQ : Front de libération du Québec, a small revolutionary group which turned to terrorism in 1970.

<sup>3</sup> Daniel Latouche, "Mass Media and Communication in a Canadian Political Crisis", in Benjamin Singer (ed.), *Communications in Canadian Society*, Toronto: Copp Clark, 1975, p. 296.

All four of these elements were present in October of 1970 when the FLQ terrorists kidnapped British Trade Commissioner, James Cross, and Quebec Minister of Labour, Pierre Laporte, and made demands on the government in return for their safety. Pierre Laporte was eventually murdered. Other notable and traumatic events were the proclamation of the War Measures Act by the federal government in response to the FLQ action, the arrests of many innocent people, and the positioning of the army in Montreal for security.

It is believed that the response of a political system to a crisis situation reveals basic characteristics that tend to remain latent in what are regarded as more normal times. The media become more important than is usually the case, and their influence on political opinion is easier to observe.

Clearly a crisis situation allows access to more information about the relationship between the media and political opinion than other occasions. The FLQ crisis is a particularly suitable event for comparison of news coverage and views on democracy in these two newspapers. One reason is that the emergency had a profound effect on the Canadian political system. Instead of diverging to outline the major developments of the crisis at this point, a chronology of the critical events has been included in Appendix B for reference.

But observing the FLQ crisis means looking at more levels than just the upset to the political system. Because of the manipulation of media both by the terrorists (using two radio stations as their mouthpiece; insisting on the publication of their manifesto) and by the governments (under the War Measures Act, absolute restriction to print or broadcast except for developments officially released), the crisis became a battle for the conquering of public opinion. Because the invocation of the War Measures Act stirred up protest against the abrogation of civil rights, the crisis became a debate on the understanding of democracy. And because the army was marched into the streets of Montreal and innocent people were being arrested, the crisis also became a debate on the governments' legitimate use of force to resolve a conflict, an issue compatible with the value of democracy.

Why examine and compare the interpretation of a crisis in the press ? It is of great interest to learn what aspects of a significant political event are stressed in the daily newspapers. In deciding the issues of the day that are to receive the readers' attention, the printed press is in effect setting the agenda. In communications research, this function of the press is referred to as the agenda-setting function.

When readers sit down with a paper, they are not necessarily thinking that the issues they are reading about are ones chosen by the editor as important enough to print. An editor's choice is influenced by his own news values, his subjective standards, space considerations, directions from owners (or his idea of the owner's viewpoint), etc. The

press, under the editors' control, helps to define political issues of the day, and has been referred to as one of the social mechanisms through which the public is integrated into politics<sup>4</sup>. In this sense, the editors of *La Presse* and *The Toronto Daily Star* play a role in fashioning political opinion for their readers.

Thus, a study such as this is not only seeking to identify opinion of the editorial board of two newspapers, but to observe the way in which public opinion has been influenced, even shaped, in two large audiences of Canadians.

The content analysis of *La Presse* and *The Toronto Daily Star* was designed to allow for a stable and valid comparison of opinion. These particular newspapers were chosen for their similarity in circulation, target audience, style of expression, and city of publication, as is discussed further in Chapter Two. The time period is the month of October 1970, though relevant articles were not printed before October 5th, the day of the first kidnapping. In the course of the study, much of the methodology will be explained, but an outline in general terms at this time will map out the study framework.

Chapter I will provide the context for an analysis of the crisis events, with some general comments on the 1960s in Quebec, an overview of the political context and the ideological debate of the day, a look at concentration of the press (a relevant aspect of

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<sup>4</sup> John Porter, "The Ideological System : The Mass Media", in *The Vertical Mosaic: An Analysis of Social Class and Power in Canada*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965, p. 457-460.

the cultural context), as well as some brief background notes about the FLQ organization.

Chapter II will create a framework for the study, explaining the principal dimensions of democracy, specific characteristics of Canadian democracy, and the way in which democracy was put to the test for the first time in Canada with the emergency situation of October 1970. The research design is also outlined in this chapter, with explanations of time and data limits, methodology, and categories of analysis.

Chapter III will explain the treatment of results, and lay out the findings with evaluations of their implications. The results rely heavily on the lists of categories used to classify the themes of the 229 news stories, 45 editorials, 124 letters, and 17 special opinion pieces collected from both newspapers. These lists are available for reference in Appendix A. Categories were formed on the basis of theoretical evaluation, tested with a random sample, and then adjusted to ensure they were independent, exhaustive, mutually exclusive, and reflecting the purpose of the research.

The relationship of the debate on democracy and the events of the October 1970 crisis is clearly seen when reading this list of categories, but is more fully understood when preceded by the contextual and theoretical support of Chapters I and II.

Where no English version of a French reference was available, the author's translations of quotations have been included as footnotes to facilitate the reading of the text.

## CHAPTER I

### POLITICAL AND CULTURAL CONTEXT

Though impossible to pinpoint the beginning of any social process with an exact date, the year 1960 holds a particular importance in the study of Quebec's social history. The "Quiet Revolution" is the label given to a period which has inspired much analysis and interpretation, and this title is associated with cultural change and social / economic transformation, as well as political upheaval. It is the year 1960 which is almost unanimously used to signal the beginning of this "revolution", and is thus considered a major turning point in the history of Quebec.

Many authors have cautioned against adopting a mechanical attitude with regard to this date in the analysis of social change. Jean-Louis Roy, for example, believes these changes to have their roots in the period from 1945 to 1960. In his opinion, a criticism of traditional society developed during this period; in fact, the whole of society in these years was starting to question the foundations and the social and economic choices of traditional Quebec society<sup>1</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> Jean-Louis Roy, *La marche des Québécois: le temps des ruptures, 1945-60*, Ottawa, Éditions Leméac, 1976.



Réjean Pelletier is another author to point out that "les années soixante ne marquent pas une rupture par rapport à la période antérieure, mais qu'elles s'inscrivent plutôt en continuité<sup>2</sup>". He affirms that the young generation of 1950 knew the spirit of criticism and rejected not only the traditional nationalism which dominated Quebec, but also the nationalist doctrine itself. The role of the Church as well as the role of the State were in question.

Many would say, therefore, that in 1959, the majority of Quebec society agreed on the need for social reform. After the death of Duplessis, after the aborted reform movement of his successors Sauvé and Barrette, and after the election of the new liberal regime of Jean Lesage, Quebec society had gone from "the respect for tradition" to "the challenge of progress". In the analysis of Denis Monière, it was a turning point in the development of ideologies in Quebec, signalling the beginning of a new social era<sup>3</sup>.

The label of "Quiet Revolution" was first used by an English-Canadian journalist, but was quickly adopted into French vocabulary as "La Révolution tranquille" and is used to sum up the distinctive character of the 1960s, though the limits are vague and are sometimes even extended into the 1970s. What exactly is meant by the expression is unfortunately less clear than one would like. It is often criticized for being an exaggerated way to depict the actual changes which took place during this period, for they were far

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<sup>2</sup> Réjean Pelletier, "La Révolution tranquille", in Gérard Daigle (dir.), *Le Québec en jeu*, Montréal, Les Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 1992, p. 611. "The 1960s do not signal a rupture with the former period, but rather is in keeping with it" (author's translation).

<sup>3</sup> Denis Monière, *Le développement des idéologies au Québec des origines à nos jours*, Montréal, Éditions Québec Amérique, 1977.

from "revolutionary" in a North American context. Scholars frequently point to transformation of a way of thinking rather than concrete structural changes. Sociologist Fernand Dumont identifies the quality of the revolution as being cultural and ideological<sup>4</sup>, as does Guy Rocher when he describes the preparation of the Quiet Revolution as a slow questioning of ideas, ideologies, attitudes and mentalities<sup>5</sup>. At the beginning of the 1960s, the ideas which had dominated for more than a century were questioned, even discarded. Kenneth McRoberts and Dale Posgate identify four different elements of this ideological revolution : the idea of "catching up" socially and economically; the newly-affirmed confidence in the French Canadian; the passage from identification with "French Canada" to identification with "Quebec"; and the new attitude with regards to the state<sup>6</sup>.

During the 1950s, the men who dominated contemporary politics fought against the Duplessis regime in various ways. Pierre Trudeau, with several other intellectuals, circulated philosophical pamphlets speaking out against Duplessis and the traditional nationalists. René Lévesque was the most popular radio and television commentator at Radio-Canada and played a large part in the producers' strike of 1959. Jean Marchand was the chief of the National Syndicate Confederation. Pierre Laporte attacked the Union Nationale regime at the Legislative Assembly as a correspondent for the newspaper *Le Devoir*. Pierre Vallières, who was to become the thinker behind the FLQ, finished his classical studies and prepared to join Pierre Trudeau and Gérard Pelletier at

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<sup>4</sup> Fernand Dumont, "Une révolution culturelle?", in Fernand Dumont (dir.), *Idéologies au Canada Français, 1940-1976*, Québec, Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 1981, p. 12.

<sup>5</sup> Guy Rocher, *Le Québec en mutation*, Montréal, Hurtubise HMH, 1973, p. 20.

<sup>6</sup> Kenneth McRoberts and Dale Posgate, *Développement et modernisation du Québec*, Montréal, Boréal Express, 1983, p. 98-99.

*Cité libre*, a critical intellectual journal. André Laurendeau, later the co-president of the Royal Commission for Bilingualism and Biculturalism, was an editorialist at the newspaper *Le Devoir*.

Those in opposition who took it upon themselves to fashion the way of change in Quebec were not of a homogeneous approach. They did have some things in common : "anti-Duplessism" and a vision of modernization are two examples of shared themes which tied them together. But there was a great deal of diversity in opinion, even opposition on certain important points<sup>7</sup>. Two emerging trends merit particular attention : the new federalism and the new nationalism.

### ***Political context***

Ideological conflict between Canadian liberalism and French-Canadian nationalism has existed since Confederation, and is a controversy largely based on Quebec's place in the Canadian federal state. The players on the central "battleground" of Quebec are on the one hand, the French-Canadian federalists, who hold that French Canadians must ensure survival by striving for excellence, by focusing on modernization, and by participating in Canada, and on the other hand, the nationalists, who affirm that French-Canadian survival depends on the collective action, as a national entity, of French Canadians.

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<sup>7</sup> Paul-André Linteau, René Durocher, et Jean-Claude Robert, *Histoire du Québec contemporain, T. II, Le Québec depuis 1930*, Montréal, Boréal, 1986, p. 350.

In the 1960s and 70s, Canadians were witnesses to the dominant political role played by two Quebec Francophones : Pierre Elliott Trudeau and René Lévesque. Both men held deep convictions and precise ideas concerning this debate, for the question touched the very essence of existence for the community in which they were both deeply rooted. Neither politician created the controversy which opposed them : it existed long before their entrance into politics and persists still to this day.

Because the present study concerns events of the October crisis of 1970, these opposing ideologies are of great interest, as they illuminate the political context of the day and provide insight into such areas as the provocation of the crisis, the reasons for and the reactions against the proclamation of the War Measures Act at a time of peace in Canada. The writings of Pierre Elliott Trudeau and René Lévesque, especially their definitions of "nation", "federalism" and "nationalism" provide the essence of the ideological debate. Also important to the portrayal of the political climate of the 1960s are the writings of Pierre Vallières, the most prominent theorist and strategist of the FLQ. As Trudeau was developing his federalist ideas and Lévesque his views on nationalism, Vallières was elaborating his general criticism of society and his strategy for Quebec independence.

#### The Trudeau / Lévesque debate

On a superficial level, constitutional quarrelling in Canada could be seen as mainly a disagreement between the Quebec and the federal governments. Sociologist Fernand

Dumont suggested that it is less an argument between two levels of government than the coming to terms with a historical misunderstanding enduring since the time of Confederation<sup>8</sup>. According to Dumont, the belief of French Canadians in 1867 that Confederation was a pact between two nations, though perhaps a misunderstanding at its origin, was propagated through history and was the basis of Quebec's firm attachment to cultural duality in the country of Canada. He goes on to state that Quebec nationalism was not the political revolution it is often perceived to be, but an affirmation of a belief held in Quebec since Confederation, and one on which they believed the federation to be based.

The two roads available to Canadians in light of this "historical misunderstanding", as Dumont calls it, were either to subtract Quebec from a political organization based on an illusion, which was the basis of the sovereignty-association project, or to rebuild Canada on a more explicit understanding, which was the road the country eventually travelled with Pierre Trudeau at the helm.

Pierre Elliott Trudeau and René Lévesque : both from Quebec, both dedicated in their own way to the survival and the growth of a modern French-Canadian society. In the same year, Trudeau and Lévesque both published a book, each one proposing a future for Canada, French Canada, and Quebec. *Federalism and the French Canadians* (originally published as *Le Fédéralisme et la société canadienne-française*) consists of a series of essays and polemic articles written by Trudeau between 1957 and 1964. These

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<sup>8</sup> Fernand Dumont, *Raison commune*, Montréal, Boréal, 1995, p. 33.

essays attempted to analyse Canadian federalism and the place of French Canadians, especially Quebecers, in the federal system. René Lévesque's work, entitled *Option Québec*, is a compilation of newspaper articles, government documents, speech excerpts and declarations from various prominent figures. These two works, along with some other speeches (Lévesque did not often use written texts) outline each man's vision of the road for Canada and show the development of the ideological debate.

René Lévesque began his book by saying: "Nous sommes des Québécois". For him, this meant that " nous sommes attachés à ce seul coin du monde où nous puissions être pleinement nous-mêmes, ce Québec qui, nous le sentons bien, est le seul endroit où il nous soit possible d'être vraiment chez nous"<sup>9</sup>. In July of 1963, in an interview granted to the newspaper *Le Devoir*, Lévesque says that two fundamental facts would determine Quebec's course of action :

Toute notre action dans l'immédiat, dit-il, doit tenir compte de deux données fondamentales. La première: le Canada français est une nation véritable, il renferme les éléments essentiels à la vie nationale et possède une unité, des ressources humaines et matérielles, un équipement et des cadres comparables ou supérieurs à ceux d'un grand nombre de peuples du monde. La deuxième, c'est que nous ne sommes pas un peuple souverain, politiquement. Il ne s'agit pas d'examiner pour l'instant si nous pourrions l'être ou non: nous ne le sommes pas. Donc une nation authentique, mais une nation qui ne possède pas la souveraineté. C'est à partir de ces deux pôles ou en fonction de ces deux réalités que nous devons travailler<sup>10</sup>.

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<sup>9</sup> René Lévesque, *Option Québec*, Montréal. Éditions de l'Homme, 1968, p. 19. "We are Quebecers. We are attached to the only corner of the world where we can be fully ourselves, this Quebec which, as we deeply sense, is the only corner of the world where it's truly possible for us to feel at home".

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 204. "All our action for the moment must take into consideration two fundamental facts. The first is this : French Canada is a real nation, it holds all the elements essential to the life of a nation and it possesses unity, both human and material resources, a set-up and staff equal to or better than what can be found in a many other populations. The second : we are not a politically sovereign nation. Right now, the point is not if we could be or not : we are not. Therefore we are a genuine nation, but a nation without sovereignty. It is according to these two realities that we need to work" (author's translation).

At the time, Lévesque still believed it possible to solve the problem from within the federal system. "...Dans un Canada qui se veut bien portant, le rôle et les moyens législatifs, fiscaux, administratifs de cet État-nation qu'est le Québec doivent acquérir le maximum d'ampleur et d'autonomie que le régime fédératif peut supporter<sup>11</sup>". In September of 1963, he appealed once again to Ottawa for a redistribution of fiscal powers, and in October, said that if the redistribution was not possible, that Quebec would have no other choice than to separate. "Ce n'est pas la fin du monde!...Dans un contexte qui menace notre existence, ce n'est pas à nous d'accepter de disparaître<sup>12</sup>".

In time, Lévesque's criticism of the federal system became stronger and his ideas more openly nationalistic. In 1963, he described "nation" as "a group of men of the same cultural family with a place on the map", and stated that it was necessary to use "nationalism" to heal the economic sickness of Quebec. "The question is to use it as much as possible, because no one is ever sure of controlling it, no one can actually control this force<sup>13</sup>". For Lévesque, the nationalization of electric power was not simply an economic move, but rather "une étape qui devait permettre aux Québécois de devenir maîtres chez eux<sup>14</sup>".

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<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 204. "In the best interest of a healthy country, federal Canada should support the maximum reach and autonomy of the legislative, fiscal and administrative roles of this state-nation Quebec" (author's translation).

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 205. "It's not the end of the world! ... In a context which threatens our existence, we cannot allow ourselves to disappear" (author's translation).

<sup>13</sup> René Lévesque, "Quebec's Economic Future". *The Montreal Star, Seminar on Quebec*, Montréal, 1963, p. 78.

<sup>14</sup> Ramsay Cook, *op.cit.*, p. 366. ... "a step which ought to allow Quebecers to become masters of their own home" (author's translation).

As early as 1964, René Lévesque had come to the conclusion that there were only two solutions to the Quebec situation: associated states or independence :

Le Québec étouffe dans les cadres d'une Confédération vieillie, désuète, et le *statu quo* est intenable pour un Québec qui a fini de survivre et qui désormais sait qu'il peut vivre; ou bien alors le Québec deviendra au sein du Canada un État associé, doté d'un statut spécial, expansion en tant que nation; ou bien le Québec sera indépendant, libre arbitre de son destin dans les limites, bien sûr, qu'impose l'interdépendance des nations au XXe siècle<sup>15</sup>.

In a 1967 text, Lévesque proposed an option for Quebec in an attempt to end the instability which was growing from the political hesitation. First, he insisted on the need to be entirely rid of an outdated federal regime, stating that neither the maintenance of federalism nor any minor modification of the status quo could resolve the problem. "Le Québec doit devenir un État souverain ". He then suggested a continued association, not only as neighbours but as partners in a common market. Otherwise stated, he proposed :

...un régime dans lequel deux nations, l'une dont la patrie serait le Québec, l'autre réarrangeant à son gré le reste du pays, s'associent dans une adaptation originale de la formule courante des marchés communs, pour former un nouvel ensemble qui pourrait, par exemple, s'appeler l'*Union canadienne*<sup>16</sup>.

René Lévesque's vision of Canada was shared by others who feared the diluting of their culture in a country that was moving towards the multicultural vision of Trudeau.

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<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 207-208. "Quebec is suffocating within the framework of an aging, out-of-date Confederation, and *status quo* is untenable for a Quebec which from now on knows it can live and not just survive; in such a case, Quebec must either become an associated state within Canada, with special status, or it must be independent, author of its own destiny, of course within the limits imposed by the interdependence of nations in the twentieth century" (author's translation).

<sup>16</sup> René Lévesque, "Un Québec souverain dans une nouvelle Union canadienne" (1967), in René Lévesque, *Oui*, Montréal, Éditions de l'homme, 1980, p. 14-16. " (...) a regime in which two nations, one whose homeland would be Quebec, the other rearranging the rest of the country to please themselves, are associated through an adaptation of the current formula of common markets, in order to form a new assembly which could be called, for example, *Union canadienne* (*Canadian Union*)" (author's translation).



For Lévesque, it was necessary to establish relations between two equal nations. Quebec was at all times his central concern.

Quebec was also at the heart of Pierre Elliott Trudeau's interests. In his writings, his prime objective was to rid his province of the "reactionary, paternalistic and nationalistic regime" of Duplessis. Together with Gérard Pelletier, Trudeau founded in 1950 the journal *Cité libre*, "l'un des canaux d'expression et des centres de rassemblement privilégiés du nouveau libéralisme"<sup>17</sup>. The *Cité libre* team was an advocate for change, for the abandonment of traditions, for the democratization of institutions and of behaviour; in short, for Quebec's "entrance into the modern world".

For Trudeau, the best way to fight the old regime was to give back to the people of Quebec their sense of values and of democratic customs. His essay entitled "Some Obstacles to Democracy in Quebec" in *Federalism and the French Canadians* consists of an impassioned plea in favour of democratization and an attack on nationalism, which represented to him an obstacle on the road to democracy.

Trudeau's conviction that nationalism constituted one of the principal obstacles to French Canadian progress began its development at the time of his participation in the Asbestos strike. Following the publication of his work *La grève de l'amiante* in 1956, in which he attacked the traditional social and national ideology, he was considered an "anti-

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<sup>17</sup> Linteau *et.al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 352. "...one of the channels of expression and central gatherings for the new liberalism" (author's translation).

nationalist". In 1964, he along with six other intellectuals attempted a response to the national question in the publication of "Manifeste pour une politique fonctionnelle" in *Cité libre* and in *The Canadian Forum*. They declared :

Il importe, dans le contexte politique actuel, de revaloriser avant tout la personne, indépendamment de ses accidents ethniques, géographiques ou religieux. L'ordre social et politique doit être fondé au premier chef sur les attributs universels de l'homme, non sur ce qui le particularise. Un ordre de priorité, au niveau politique et social, qui repose sur la personne est totalement incompatible avec un ordre de priorité appuyé sur la race, la religion ou la nationalité<sup>18</sup>.

At the time of his arrival in Ottawa in 1965, Pierre Elliott Trudeau had become a hardened opponent to nationalism, even though he had never denied the existence or the value of nations. "Ce n'est pas l'idée de nation qui est rétrograde, c'est l'idée que la nation doive nécessairement être souveraine<sup>19</sup>", he wrote in 1962. René Lévesque believed that nationalism could arise from a positive impulse capable of strengthening reform; Trudeau was convinced that "le nationalisme, fondé sur l'homogénéité ethnique, était mû par un sentiment négatif, destiné, à la limite, à étouffer toute réforme<sup>20</sup>".

*Federalism and the French Canadians* is an exposition of Trudeau's fundamental political philosophy of the day : strong opposition to the nationalist ideology, and a solid

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<sup>18</sup> "Manifeste pour une politique fonctionnelle", *Cité libre*, mai 1964, quoted in Thomas and Trudeau, *Les années Trudeau: La recherche d'une société juste*. Montréal, Le jour, 1990, p. 374. "In this political context, it is essential to give new value to the person, apart from relative qualities such as ethnic group, geography or religion. Social and political order should be based primarily on universal attributes of man, not on what makes them differ".

<sup>19</sup> Pierre Elliott Trudeau, "La nouvelle trahison des clercs", in *Le fédéralisme et la société canadienne-française*, Montréal, Éditions HMH, 1967, p. 161. "It's not the idea of nation which is retrograde, it's the idea that the nation must necessarily be sovereign".

<sup>20</sup> Ramsay Cook, *op.cit.*, p. 374. "Nationalism, based on ethnic homogeneity, is prompted by a negative emotion, and is destined, in the worst case scenario, to stifle all reform" (author's translation).

commitment to federalism. For this politician, fédéralism is the political régime of reason and democracy :

Il devient maintenant évident que le fédéralisme a toujours été un produit de la raison. Il naquit d'une décision prise par des politiciens pragmatiques à l'effet d'envisager sans détour la réalité telle qu'elle est, et en particulier le fait de l'hétérogénéité de la population du monde. Il répond à une tentative de trouver des compromis rationnels entre les groupes et les intérêts divergents que l'histoire a mis sur une même route, mais c'est un compromis fondé sur la volonté populaire<sup>21</sup>.

Trudeau turned up in Ottawa as the new Minister of Justice armed with a project which he called functional federalism. Under such a system, the federal government would use its authority to see to it that French Canadians felt at home everywhere in Canada.

In the eyes of many, Trudeau's official affirmation of multiculturalism as the "essence" of Canadian reality removed the country even farther from reach as a comfortable home for Quebec. Dumont states that this move reduced French Quebec to being no more than one culture among many others in Canada, and that although bilingualism was retained, its meaning changed when separated from culture. The traditional duality between the English and French cultures was erased, collective rights were replaced with individual rights, and it was feared that a government favouring multiculturalism would scatter cultures while approving federal subventions to keep them alive like "folklore"<sup>22</sup>.

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<sup>21</sup> Pierre Trudeau, "Fédéralisme, nationalisme et raison", in *Le fédéralisme et la société canadienne-française*, Montréal, Éditions HMH, 1967, p. 161. "It is now becoming obvious that federalism has all along been a product of reason in politics. It was born of a decision by pragmatic politicians to face facts as they are, particularly the fact of the heterogeneity of the world's population. It is an attempt to find a rational compromise between the divergent interest-groups which history has thrown together; but it is a compromise based on the will of the people".

<sup>22</sup> Fernand Dumont, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

Many individuals' visions for the future of Canada were fashioned either by Lévesque or by Trudeau. Trudeau's decision to take the country down the road of federalism, multiculturalism, and individual rights was both popular and despised, and this social and political division was the context from which the FLQ crisis of October 1970 was to emerge.

### Pierre Vallières and the Ideology of the FLQ

In the early 1960s, the political party system in Quebec comprised two parties : the "Parti libéral" and the "Union nationale". Other parties appeared in response to voters' desire to see Quebec move towards political independence : the "Rassemblement pour l'indépendance nationale"(RIN), the "Ralliement national"(RN), followed by the "Parti québécois"(PQ), a formation of social democratic leaning led by René Lévesque. But these groups do not represent the whole of the Quebec independence movement.

Parallel to them (and often in opposition to them) existed from 1963 to 1970 the "Front de libération du Québec"(FLQ) , a clandestine group calling for the overthrow of social order by way of violence. To arouse the collective Quebec conscience, it placed blame on the establishment and attacked colonial symbols. The group's fundamental postulate was that political independence would happen by social revolution. Determinedly Marxist, the FLQ drew inspiration from the example of revolutions or rebellions in other countries : Algeria, Cuba, Vietnam, Latin America. They fought to

sever the constitutional ties between Quebec and the rest of Canada by the violent means of bombs, sabotage, armed robbery, manifestations degenerating into riots, etc.

Pierre Vallières and Charles Gagnon were the thinkers behind the FLQ; Vallières was the leader who seriously attempted to provide a philosophic base to his revolutionary aspirations. He considered himself a professional revolutionary, ready to die "for that human ideal which has become the very reason of our existence<sup>23</sup>". In his work *Nègres blancs d'Amérique*, (published later in English as *White Niggers of America*), he explains in detail the origins of his revolutionary philosophy. The book was written in 1967 while Vallières was already imprisoned in the United States for his action in the name of the FLQ. In his book, he affirms :

Ces nègres, qui n'ont pas tous la peau de la même couleur, qui ne parlent pas tous la même langue, qui croient des prophètes différents, qui habitent des ghettos étrangers les uns aux autres et qui subissent de diverses façons la dictature du même système économique, politique et social, tous ces nègres que les esclavagistes, les businessmen et les politiciens s'ingénient, depuis des siècles, à dresser les uns contre les autres pour mieux les exploiter et les maintenir dans l'impuissance, savent, aujourd'hui, que la liberté et la paix, dans ce monde d'argent, de violence et d'oppression, ne peuvent se conquérir que par la force du nombre et des armes. Ils ont déjà le nombre. Les armes viendront en leur temps<sup>24</sup>.

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<sup>23</sup> Gustave Morf, "Who is Pierre Vallières?", in *Terror in Quebec*, Toronto: Clarke, Irwin and Co., 1970, p. 111.

<sup>24</sup> Pierre Vallières, *Nègres blancs d'Amérique*, Montréal, Éditions Parti pris, 1968, p. 14. "These niggers, who are not all of the same colour, who do not all speak the same language, who believe in different prophets, who live in different ghettos and who suffer in different ways the dictatorship of the same economic, political and social system, all these niggers who are pitted against each other, by businessmen and politicians, as a means of exploiting and controlling them, know today that freedom and peace, in this world of money, violence and oppression, can only conquer through the strength of numbers and arms. They already have numbers. The arms will come in good time".

Vallières adds that the "Niggers of America" -- black and white -- would associate themselves with the struggle for freedom in all of the five continents, "solidaires dans cette révolution de l'homme par l'homme qui, après avoir balayé toute la pourriture du vieux système, parviendra aux espoirs de la société nouvelle, sans maîtres ni esclaves, sans guerres ni racisme, sans banques ni voleurs<sup>25</sup>".

When the crisis broke out in October 1970, Pierre Vallières was 32 years old, his comrade, Charles Gagnon, was 31, and the Prime Minister Trudeau, 51. But there was more than just a difference of generation which separated the philosophy of the two camps. In 1963, Vallières was invited to take over the editorship of the journal *Cité libre* by its founder, Pierre Trudeau, a situation which did not last long. Vallières had turned his back on the viewpoint of the founders and expounded on his revolutionary and separatist ideas. In his book, he accuses Trudeau and Pelletier of having become traitors who "devront assumer toutes les conséquences de cette trahison<sup>26</sup>". Once themselves protesters under Duplessis, the editors of *Cité libre* suffered a shock when, having urged the younger generation in 1962 to use the journal to express their ideas, they discovered a large number of responses in favour of separatism. For Vallières, the *Cité libre* experience led to the founding of *Révolution québécoise*, to regular contribution to the

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<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 21. "...standing together in this revolution of man by man who, after having swept "all the rot from the old system", will attain the hope of the new society, "without masters or slaves, without wars or racism, without banks or robbers".

<sup>26</sup> Pierre Vallières, *Nègres blancs d'Amérique*, Montréal, Éditions Parti pris, 1968, p. 213. "... should take upon themselves all the consequences of this betrayal".

journal *Parti pris*, to membership in the "Mouvement de libération populaire"(MLP), and finally, to the FLQ in 1965<sup>27</sup>.

According to Pierre Vallières, the objective of the revolution in Quebec was the elimination of the oppressive institutions of capitalism, and the liberation of individuals so they may "se réaliser comme personnes, à travers la fraternité, l'amour, la solidarité, etc."<sup>28</sup>. The first FLQ manifest was circulated on April 16, 1963. The first of three manifests, this call to the nation briefly explained the *raison d'être* of the FLQ :

Colonisés, nous le sommes politiquement, socialement, économiquement. [...] Acquérons les leviers politiques vitaux, prenons le contrôle de notre économie, assainissons radicalement nos cadres sociaux; arrachons le carcan colonialiste, mettons à la porte les impérialistes qui vivent par l'exploitation des travailleurs du Québec. Les immenses richesses naturelles du Québec doivent appartenir aux Québécois !

Pour ce faire, une solution, une seule : la Révolution nationale au sein de l'INDÉPENDANCE. Autrement, le peuple du Québec ne peut espérer vivre libre. Mais il ne suffit plus de vouloir l'indépendance, de militer au sein des partis politiques indépendantistes existants. Les colonialistes ne lâcheront pas si facilement un tel morceau de choix. Les partis politiques indépendantistes ne pourront jamais avoir la puissance nécessaire pour vaincre la puissance politique et économique coloniale. De plus, l'indépendance seule ne résoudrait rien. Elle doit à tout prix être complétée par la révolution sociale<sup>29</sup>.

<sup>27</sup> Nicholas Regush, *Pierre Vallières : The Revolutionary Process in Québec*, New York: Dial Press, 1973, p. 80.

<sup>28</sup> Pierre Vallières, *Nègres blancs d'Amérique*, Montréal, Éditions Parti pris, 1968, p. 362. "...be fulfilled as people, by way of fraternity, love, solidarity, etc."

<sup>29</sup> "Message du FLQ à la nation", in Comeau, Cooper et Vallières, *FLQ : un projet révolutionnaire*, Outremont, VLB éditeur, 1990, p. 13, 16. "Colonized, politically, socially, economically(...) Let us acquire the vital political levers, let us take control of our economy; let us rip off the colonial yoke. let us toss out the imperialists who live off the exploited workers of Quebec. The vast natural wealth of Quebec must belong to Quebecers! To do this, there is only one solution: the national revolution at the heart of INDEPENDENCE. Otherwise, the people of Quebec can never hope to live free lives. But desiring independence, participating in the existing independantist political parties is not enough. The colonialists won't let go of something so good so easily. The political parties for independence could never possess the necessary strength to vanquish colonial political and economical power. Moreover, independence alone would not solve anything. It must at all costs be accompanied by social revolution" (author's translation).

The manifest closed with a call to arms destined for all Quebec patriots.

The attempted revolt of these fighters for independence was directed at two targets : Canadian federalism and the White American capitalist regime. The following is an excerpt from the October 1970 Manifest :

Nous avons cru un moment qu'il valait la peine de canaliser nos énergies, nos impatiences comme le dit si bien M. Lévesque, dans le Parti québécois, mais la victoire libérale montre bien que ce qu'on appelle démocratie au Québec n'est en fait et depuis toujours que la « democracy » des riches. La victoire du parti libéral en ce sens n'est en fait que la victoire des faiseurs d'élections Simard-Controni. En conséquence, le parlementarisme britannique, c'est bien fini et le Front de Libération du Québec ne se laissera jamais distraire par les miettes électorales que les capitalistes anglo-saxons lancent dans la basse-cour québécoise à tous les quatre ans. Nombre de Québécois ont compris et ils vont agir. Bourassa dans l'année qui vient va prendre de la maturité: 100 000 travailleurs révolutionnaires organisés et armés<sup>30</sup>!

This is the third of the FLQ manifests, the public broadcasting of which was one of the demands made by the FLQ during the course of negotiations with the Quebec government, at the time of the October 1970 events.

It may be said that the new way of thinking prevalent in Quebec after 1960, along with the explosive vision of new possibilities, gave rise to the sporadic violence of the FLQ, which in turn led to the October crisis and the resulting proclamation of the War

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<sup>30</sup> Louis Fournier, *F.L.Q.: Histoire d'un mouvement clandestin*, Montréal, Éditions Québec Amérique, 1982. "It occurred to us that it was worth it to channel our energies, our impatience, as Lévesque called it, into the Parti québécois, but the liberal victory proves that what we call democracy in Quebec actually is not, and since the beginning, has only been the "democracy" of the rich. The liberal victory in this sense is only the victory of Simard-Controni, makers of elections. Thus, the British parliamentary system is finished and the FLQ will never again be distracted by the electoral crumbs thrown by the anglo-saxon capitalists every four years. Many Quebecers have understood and they will act. Bourassa will learn this coming year : 100 000 revolutionary workers, organized and armed!" (author's translation)



Measures Act. In the mid-1960s, the revolutionary separatism acquired its theorist, just as federalism acquired its own literary defendant. Pierre Vallières passed through a period of teaching and encouragement under Gérard Pelletier and Pierre Elliott Trudeau at newspapers *La Presse* and *Cité libre*, where he gradually developed his criticism of society. At the same time, Trudeau and Pelletier hardened their federalism and anti-nationalism attitudes. For the FLQ, Vallières provided an analysis and justification for terrorism; for Ottawa, Pierre Trudeau provided an analysis and reasoning for inflexible anti-separatism.

The actions of the Front de libération du Québec, government responses, and reactions to the War Measures Act are far better understood when first introduced by their context of opposing political ideologies. Chapter II will look further into the way in which Canadian democracy was dramatically put to the test for the first time in the country's history by the events of October 1970 in Quebec. The above exposition of the political climate will provide some context for that discussion, but in addition, an aspect of the era's cultural situation will help shed light on the issues in question. As this study is concerned with communications, in particular the daily printed press, an understanding of the industry and its involvement with the crisis will also offer valuable contextual information.

## *Cultural context*

### Mass media in Quebec

In Quebec, as in the rest of Canada, the mass media is largely owned and controlled by big business, which has a grave effect on the bias of information. Used as a vehicle for the dominant ideology of society's elite, the media reinforce the existing political and economic systems. In his study of Canada's economic elite published in 1975, Wallace Clement comes to the following conclusions: (i) The media elite is a growing sector of the economic elite (ii) the revenue base of the dominant media complexes comes essentially from advertising, therefore profit depends on the economic elite (iii) the media elite is in a position to control information<sup>31</sup>.

During the Duplessis years, the Quebec press was one of the supports for the harmonious ideology of social peace. As in many other sectors, the Quiet Revolution upset the traditional conservatism of the mass media, ushering in the most agitated phase in the history of the Quebec press<sup>32</sup>. Between 1958 and 1967, all the daily newspapers and the national weeklies of Quebec changed either owner, administrator, editor, or writer-in-chief<sup>33</sup>.

This agitation in the media followed the evolution of the society in which it was a part, and in which it continued to maintain social consensus. In his political history of the

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<sup>31</sup> Wallace Clement, *The Canadian Corporate Elite : An Analysis of Economic Power*, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1975, p. 342.

<sup>32</sup> Marc Raboy, *Libérer la communication*, Montréal, Éditions Nouvelle Optique, 1983, p. 23.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 24.

newspaper *La Presse*, Pierre Godin states that the newspaper constitutes, for the dominant class, a political instrument of which the key function is to maintain ideological consensus<sup>34</sup>. He admits that his history of *La Presse* would be impossible to write without constant mention of the political and financial dimension. The foundation, the growth, and the daily production are all influenced by the play of many actors, particularly those that gravitate around the political and financial powers<sup>35</sup>.

### Concentration of the press

Powerful ownership does not, however, represent as big a threat to the unbiased purity of information as the concentration of this ownership. Wallace Clement signalled the danger of a media industry monopolized by a small number of dominant sources in his study. In his opinion, the lack of diverse sources and competing ideologies creates a situation where one position could completely dominate all alternatives<sup>36</sup>.

Concentration of ownership in the private press was rapidly growing in Quebec towards the middle of the 1960s. In 1970, the groups owned by Paul Desmarais, head of Power Corporation, and by Pierre Péladeau, leader of the Québecor publications empire, already controlled 50.6% of the circulation of French-language daily newspapers in Quebec. The trend towards concentration in Canada was spreading, the number of groups having dwindled and their part of the market having expanded. In Quebec, it

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<sup>34</sup> Pierre Godin, *La lutte pour l'information : Histoire de la presse écrite au Québec*, Montréal, Le Jour, Éditeur, 1981, p. 13.

<sup>35</sup> Pierre Godin, *ibid.*, p. 23.

<sup>36</sup> Wallace Clement, *op. cit.*, p. 287.

became more like monopoly. 90 % of the French daily printed press was controlled by three groups : Québecor (Pierre Péladeau; 46.5 %), Gesca (Paul Desmarais; 28.8 %) and UniMédia (Jacques Francoeur; 14.7 %). Only one independent French-language daily remained in Quebec : *Le Devoir*<sup>37</sup>.

A similar situation existed in Ontario. Torstar, which publishes the *Toronto Star*, is a media conglomerate involved in publishing 27 community papers, books and magazines. In 1970, Torstar counted for 22 % of all newspaper circulation in Ontario.

What are the repercussions of a social phenomenon like the concentration of ownership in the written press ? A quote from Paul Desmarais, the "tzar of the Quebec press"<sup>38</sup> gives an idea : "Je préfère laisser s'éteindre *La Presse* et perdre \$22 millions plutôt que de me soumettre aux demandes de contrôle des journalistes. Personne ne contrôlera ce journal, c'est mon journal"<sup>39</sup>. The business mogul would rather the public believe that concentration actually improves the quality of information, for through wise administration, it assures an economic freedom which alone can guarantee freedom of expression<sup>40</sup>. The Canadian Commission's Report on Mass Media (1970), better known as "The Davey Report" after Senator Keith Davey, was not of the same opinion as Desmarais :

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<sup>37</sup> ICEA, *La parole ça se prend*, Montréal, CEQ / ICEA, 1980, p. 85 et Marc Raboy, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

<sup>38</sup> Pierre Godin, *op. cit.*, p. 151.

<sup>39</sup> Pierre Godin, *L'information-opium*, p. 383. "I would rather let *La presse* die and lose \$22 million rather than submit to the demands of journalists for control. Nobody will control this newspaper, it's my newspaper" (author's translation).

<sup>40</sup> Pierre Godin, *La lutte pour l'information*, p. 150.

The more separate voices we have telling us what's going on, telling us how we're doing, telling us how we *should* be doing, the more effectively we can govern ourselves. In this sense, the mass media are society's suggestion box. [...]What matters is the fact that control of the media is passing into fewer hands, and that the experts agree this trend is likely to continue unabated, sooner or later it must reach the point where it collides with the public interest. The Committee believes it to be in the national interest to ensure that that point is not reached<sup>41</sup>.

The report states that the effectiveness of our democratic government depends to a great extent on how well the mass media system keeps the public informed about what is going on in society.

In 1969, the "Fédération professionnelle des journalistes du Québec" denounced concentration as a threat to freedom of the press. According to this group, the capitalist interest in information puts in question the public right to honest, complete and quality information.

Insofar as the media became totally dependant on private enterprise, the public could perceive this dependence and its implications. During the years 1969-1972, several individuals and social groups in Quebec sought to loosen the upper echelon control of information, and proposed to fellow citizens a different vision, other priorities, another way. The new public awareness inspired some popular attempts to recover control of communication from the elite in power.

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<sup>41</sup> Senate Committee on Mass Media, *Report on Mass Media* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970), quoted in T.C. Seacrest, "The Davey Report : Main Findings and Recommendations", in Benjamin Singer (ed.), *Communications in Canadian Society*, Toronto: Copp Clark, 1975, p. 164, 166.

### Popular Response to the Domination of the Media

Criticism of the moves, methods or motivation of the political and economic powers was unlikely to be given voice in the media they controlled, so these critical responses circulated mostly in the smaller intellectual journals. As early as 1959, the *Revue socialiste* appeared (le groupe Action socialiste pour l'indépendance du Québec); the following years saw the launch of *L'Indépendance* (Le Rassemblement pour l'indépendance nationale - RIN); *Québec Libre* (Front républicain pour l'indépendance); *Maintenant* (Dominicains); and the political and cultural journal, *Parti pris*<sup>42</sup>. These journals, of which the principal was *Parti pris*, were not situated in opposition to the mass media as such, but in opposition to the social system itself. Speaking in language of nationalism linked to the notion of independence and also of socialism, these small journals laid the ideological foundation for the social opposition movements which rose in the 1960s.

Certain authors claim that the October crisis was, among other things, a struggle for the temporary control of the communications system in Quebec. Daniel Latouche, for example, recognizes the objective of the kidnappings of James Cross and Pierre Laporte as being more than just publicity for the FLQ organization. In those acts, Latouche sees a strategy for creating new channels through which the FLQ could communicate directly with the population<sup>43</sup>. Consequently, official information was "caught in its own trap", to

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<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 41.

<sup>43</sup> Daniel Latouche, "Mass Media and Communication in a Canadian Political Crisis", in Benjamin Singer, ed., *Communications in Canadian Society*, Toronto, Copp Clark, 1975, p. 299.

use the expression of a Montreal journalist (writing under the name 'B.R., journaliste') who in 1971 analyzed the development of the capitalist press in Quebec.

In his article "Une information 'totalitaire', prise à son propre piège", 'B.R., journaliste' showed that the newspapers were caught in a serious problem in October 1970<sup>44</sup>. Those who had launched the crisis had found a way for political expression and held the objective of overthrowing the system, all of which threatened existing communications. First there was the publication of the FLQ Manifest, an articulate text, which suddenly reintroduced reality – the big companies, the owners, the politicians – into the world of newspaper with its straightforward language. Thus this extraordinary text put the dominant ideology into question. The government's pretence to negotiate with the FLQ actually legitimized the organization and turned it into an instant political group.

L'hégémonie de l'idéologie dominante se trouvait sérieusement mise en question, et, à part Radio-Canada, [...] aucun journal, aucun poste de radio ne se trouvait capable de réagir. Comment refuser de publier le manifeste du F.L.Q., comment ne pas faire la manchette avec les événements lorsque tous les autres journaux le font ? [...] Chacun était forcé d'exploiter à fond la crise, de peur de perdre son public<sup>45</sup>.

Permission from federal politicians to broadcast the manifest did not have the desired effect from the viewpoint of government, for the text, written in direct and colloquial

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<sup>44</sup> "B.R., journaliste", "Une information 'totalitaire', prise à son propre piège", dans Jean-Marc Pottier (éd.), *Québec-occupé*, Montréal, Éditions Parti pris, 1971, p. 211.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 214 -215. "The hegemony of the dominant ideology found itself seriously challenged, and, apart from Radio-Canada, [...] not one newspaper or radio station was able to react. How could they refuse to publish the FLQ manifest, how could they not headline with the events when all the other newspapers were doing it? [...] Each one was forced to exploit the crisis all the way, for fear of losing their public" (author's translation).

speech, did win popular support<sup>46</sup>. These opinions in favour of the manifest's spirit would never have existed if the public had been informed of the terrorist action solely by the traditional media channels.

In order to create their own means of communication, the FLQ strategy was to manoeuvre two private radio stations, CKAC and CKLM into competition with each other. They thus forced the media to "open their doors" and speak directly to the population, which would have been impossible to achieve by setting off bombs. In the words of the FLQ themselves, this was one of the major goals of their action<sup>47</sup>.

The FLQ, therefore, succeeded in taking communication into their own hands between the 5 and the 9 of October. The group imposed on the public their own interpretation of social reality. Though the political authorities acted quickly to recover their usual control of the media, it wasn't easy. During the second week of the crisis, the authorities realized that they could no longer hope to exercise political control over the situation because they had completely lost control of communications. The answer lay in the proclamation of the War Measures Act. Raboy, Latouche, B.R., and Siegel are among the analysts who see more than one objective for these war measures in a time of peace. This extreme decision would help flush out opposition in Quebec society, but these authors claim that the decision was made by the authorities primarily for the immediate re-establishment of control over communications.

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<sup>46</sup> Marc Raboy, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

<sup>47</sup> R. Comeau, *et al.*, *FLQ : un projet révolutionnaire. Lettres et écrits felquistes (1963-1982)*, Québec, VLB éditeur, 1990, p. 239.



The War Measures Act interrupted the channels of communication set up by the FLQ. It was forbidden for the media to publish news of the FLQ, except for what came directly from the authorities. The Minister of Justice Choquette declared : "Dans ce domaine très particulier, et au nom de l'intérêt général, il faut accepter que la liberté de presse soit brimée"<sup>48</sup>. 'B.R., journaliste' perceived the war measures as being a great service offered to newspaper editors : "Cette loi [...] leur fournissait la garantie que personne ne profiterait du silence des autres pour augmenter son tirage ou sa cote d'écoute. Avec bienveillance, le gouvernement leur fournissait le moyen de sauvegarder leurs intérêts supérieurs tout en protégeant leurs petits intérêts particuliers"<sup>49</sup>.

#### FLQ Background Information

To complete the background information before approaching the study framework and the empirical analysis, this study will take a brief look at the organization of the FLQ and at the escalation of violence leading up to October 1970.

The sweeping change of the "Quiet Revolution" brought new life and focus to the movement for the separation of Quebec from Canada. In the early sixties, there were both formal separatist parties formed as well as popular protests against federal

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<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 64. "In this very particular domain, and in the name of general interest, the suspension of freedom of the press must be accepted" (author's translation).

<sup>49</sup> B.R., journaliste, *op. cit.*, p. 216. "This law [...] gave them the guarantee that none would profit from the silence of others in order to boost circulation. With benevolence, the government provided them with the means to safeguard their overall interest, at the same time protecting their little individual interests" (author's translation).

institutions. Action was too slow, however, for the young men who later claimed to be the founders of the FLQ. Breaking away from the revolutionary committee *Réseau de Résistance*, the FLQ was born in late 1962 out of the socialist and separatist unrest in Quebec colleges and universities. Inspiration came from the FLN in Algeria and the Cuban revolution.

James Stewart published a book just after the crisis events which uncovered aspects of the group's structure : loosely organized, cellular, clandestine, apparently without a permanent active leadership, not only dedicated to independence, but "increasingly committed to the international theology of revolution"<sup>50</sup>. They were responsible for seven years of bombs, armed robbery and raiding, which resulted in seven deaths and many injuries, all in the name of Quebec independence and the global socialist revolution. A catalogue of systematic violence and rebellion, but certainly not a record disturbing enough to prepare Quebec and all of Canada for such a leap in terrorism as the kidnappings and murder committed in October 1970.

In the interest of a broader comparison of newspaper coverage between *La Presse* and *The Toronto Daily Star*, treatment of the early FLQ years in the two dailies was also looked at in the scope of this study. The findings, however, were not conducive to a useful comparison. During the year preceding the October crisis, the coverage of FLQ terrorism in *The Toronto Daily Star* was restricted to straight reporting of the facts of bomb incidents, etc. No editorials touched on the subject within this period.

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<sup>50</sup> James Stewart, *The FLQ : Seven Years of Terrorism*, Montreal: The Montreal Star, 1970 , p. 6.

For the same period, mentions of FLQ activity were more than twice as frequent in *La Presse*, with eleven editorials commenting on themes such as anarchy and authority, blackmail, violence and government protection. The difference in coverage can be attributed to geography : given the distance of Toronto from the scene of the terrorist acts, less intense coverage is to be expected. No comparison of opinion can be made given the lack of *Toronto Star* editorials and letters on the subject.

In this first chapter, we have outlined the underlying context, from both political and cultural perspectives, on which the study will stand more solidly and with which the empirical results will speak more clearly. Details of the crisis events have been included in Appendix B. A look at the theory of democracy and its application in Canadian society follows in Chapter 2, essential to the analysis as its supporting framework.

## CHAPTER II

### STUDY FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH DESIGN

#### *The Principle Dimensions of Democracy*

##### Defining democracy

Linguistically, the word democracy simply means government by the people, its Greek roots being "demos", the people, and "kratein", to rule<sup>1</sup>. To end the task of definition here, however, would be to leave a great many problems unsolved. Short definitions of democracy such as "a system in which the people govern themselves"; "government by consent"; "rule by the majority"; "sovereignty of the people"; or "government with equal rights for all", do not explain much, even if they meet with general approval. They seek to put too simply something which is not simple, and cannot reach the heart of the matter.

In his work, *Democracy in the Contemporary State* (1988), Frank Bealey recognises a consensus among political scientists that :

...democracy is essentially a decision-making system, assuming certain absences of restriction on free expression, with a highly developed form of citizenship. Democracy combines freedom of criticism of authority with the rights to organise in opposition to authority and to participate in the making of decisions for the whole community<sup>2</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> Carl Cohen, *Democracy*, Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1971, p. 3.

<sup>2</sup> Frank Bealey, *Democracy in the Contemporary State*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988, p. 1.

Robert Dahl uses the term "polyarchy" as a synonym for democracy, and clearly summarizes the fundamentals. He believes that the necessary conditions for polyarchy are based on opportunities for all citizens to express preferences for governmental action, and for these preferences to be weighted equally, at least at the initial stage<sup>3</sup>.

At the very foundation of democracy is the primary value of individualism. Reo Christenson points out the contrast between the individualism of democracy and the corporatism of other political systems, where individual's identities are derived from belonging to a social mass. From this initial value comes the democrat's acceptance that the self-fulfilment of each individual is to be the ultimate purpose served by the state<sup>4</sup>.

#### The fundamental principles of a democratic system

- *Popular control of policy-makers*

Several authors list popular sovereignty as the first and most general principle of democracy. This is the idea that ultimate political power resides in each man and in all men. Indispensable to modern democracies, this principle is embodied in the choosing of the policy-makers (representatives) at elections held regularly. The popular control over policy is indirect, accomplished through these chosen representatives. In both of the sample newspapers studied during the month of October 1970, a huge outcry was raised in response to the FLQ's lack of respect for this principle of democracy. Political kidnapping went far beyond the proper limits of dissent, and many letters were written

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<sup>3</sup> R. A. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956, p. 2.

<sup>4</sup> Reo Christenson, *et al.*, *Ideologies and Modern Politics*, New York: Dodd, Mead & Co, 1971, p. 180.

insisting on electoral process as the means of dissent in a democracy. The principle was also used in reference to criticism of government – often repeated was the opinion that leaders should be supported having been elected by a majority, and that elections are the way to express dissatisfaction.

Policy is constantly being formed and reformed; the popular influence upon policies, as distinct from control over policy-makers, goes on all the time and may take many legitimate forms. Interest or pressure groups are one important form of the popular influence which can affect the chances of a representative at election time.

The opinions uncovered in the content analysis revealed a belief that a democratic government had a responsibility to be in continual communication with its citizens, as popular sovereignty is essential to democracy. Particularly after the proclamation of the War Measures Act, the government was challenged in the opinion articles to be responsible to the people and justify its actions<sup>5</sup>.

- *Political equality*

Democrats believe that each person must be guaranteed equal rights in society. Along with social and economic equality, they advocate equal rights and opportunities to share in their governance. The principle of political equality is institutionalized as the equality of all adult citizens in voting and the equality before the law. "The decisions of

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<sup>5</sup> A list of the themes used for the comparison of opinion between the two newspapers can be found in Appendix A.

democratic politics shall be made among persons with equal formal weights in determining the ultimate results, and the protections and benefits of government and the law shall be equally available to all persons<sup>6</sup>". One person should have one vote; each vote should count equally. In terms of control over policy-makers, the belief in equal voting is expressed by saying that every vote should have an equal share in that control.

In his *Introduction to Democratic Theory*, H. B. Mayo emphasizes that equality of voting is not enough of itself to distinguish a democratic system from an elected dictatorship. Voting alone does not ensure popular control; manipulation of the mechanism could prevent such control. In the editorials, letters and opinion pieces studied, this principle was most often defended through the expression of the opinion that a democratic government must continually work towards social and economic equality.

- *Political freedoms*

The principle of freedom applies directly to the politics of a democratic society. Freedom of thought, expression, and action must be guaranteed in political affairs. This principle of a democratic system has also been stated in terms of "the effectiveness of the popular control<sup>7</sup>", that is, without coercion or intimidation of voters. The voting must not be merely ritual, but should effectively and freely control the decision makers. Citizens must have free access to political information; be free to hold and express political ideas; support, criticize, and oppose political figures and programs; come together for political

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<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 182.

<sup>7</sup> H. B. Mayo, *An Introduction to Democratic Theory*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1960, p. 64.

purposes; seek political influence and public office; and cast free ballots in non-corrupt elections.

The effectiveness of popular control thus involves a range of political freedoms. The freedoms of speech, assembly, and organization (which leads to the formation of political parties), are often summed up in the single concept "freedom to oppose" or "the right to dissent", often considered to be the most crucial of all the fundamental freedoms.

The exercise of this right enables any person to attempt to enlist the support of others for the redress of his grievances. The assumption is that the best antidote to unjust government and unjust policies is an atmosphere of free public controversy which culminates in secret ballot elections. In this sense, the right to dissent may be the freedom upon which our whole complex of freedoms depends<sup>8</sup>.

Political activity taking place within these rules (equality of voting and political liberties) enables the voters to effectively choose their representatives, to control the decision-makers at election times, and through them indirectly to sanction the decisions.

- *Majority rule*

A democratic system also entails the principle of majority rule and minority rights. Majority rule is a technique for implementing popular sovereignty and political equality. In an electoral system based on equality of voting, the alternative preferred by the larger number of participants in any particular decision must be selected and enforced. The minority (representatives and their supporters) obeys even though under protest, while working either to alter the policy to which they object or if possible to become a majority.

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<sup>8</sup> Alfred Alan Borovoy, *The fundamentals of our fundamental freedoms*, Ottawa: The Canadian Civil Liberties Education Trust, 1974, p. 24.



Making policy decisions within the framework of the political freedoms mentioned earlier, the majority cannot oppress the minority, infringe on their rights, or deny them the freedom to oppose and seek to become the majority. Just as the majority must respect the rights of the minority, Christenson states, so the minority has the obligation to respect the majority's right to rule. "Democracy is in peril either if the majority is tyrannical or if it cannot function"<sup>9</sup>.

The belief that protection of the majority is a fundamental principal of democracy was found in the content analysis, most often in the context of Canadians fulfilling their role in the democratic social contract, through obedience of laws, in return for the leadership and protection of the government. In some articles, the principle was also stretched to fit an idea of democracy in which the government may suspend civil liberties in a time of crisis, as the abrogation of the rights of a few would mean the safety of the majority.

Thus a democratic political system may be said to be one in which policy-making is carried out, on a majority basis, by representatives elected by the public. These elections, based on the principle of political equality, take place at periodic intervals under conditions of political freedom.

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<sup>9</sup> Reo M. Christenson, *op. cit.*, p. 187.

Democratic decision-making is meaningless unless it takes place within some framework; it has to apply to a definable number and category of people within a defined territory. Consequently, it operates within the contemporary state. Fundamental to the democratic state is the political obligation and support willed by its citizens. Another of its main foundations is the right use of the state's monopoly of legitimate force in order to preserve internal peace and order, to enforce the law, and to defend the community against external enemies. The problem of the right use of force raises not only issues of moral legitimacy and legality but also some difficult questions concerning the way in which force should be employed. Who should be entrusted with the execution of force ? How much force should be used ?

The attitudes in the sample newspapers created two poles of opinion on the role of state. The understanding of a democratic state moved from the idea of state as the protector of rights and individual liberties, to the idea of state as an enforcer of law and order. Opinions often rested somewhere in between, declaring that the state should avoid excessive use of force. The theme most often treated in the one month corpus of this study was that it is the responsibility of the state to maintain law and order by the exercise of 'legitimate' violence. Different interpretations of the role of state mean very different practices of democracy.

In the case of external attack the normal agency of the state responsible for defence is the armed forces, and in a democracy both government and citizens will expect

these defence forces to use whatever force is required to repel attack and defeat the enemy. Moreover it is a principle of democratic government that the armed services should be firmly under ultimate civil control by the democratically responsible government. But responsibility for internal security has been a matter of contention. The balance of forces, police or army, used by the state to deal with internal violence can vary according to constitutional and juridical traditions<sup>10</sup>.

An important principle which governs the use of force by the state is that the police and army must operate entirely within the framework of law. If they defy the rule of law under the pretence of protecting it they undermine the integrity, authority and public respect for the law which is essential to constitutional democracy. Constitutional provisions for such emergencies as domestic and international crises are often made in order to override the normal legislative powers of the state. Thus the state, to protect its citizens from external attack or from internal political violence, may legitimately and legally extend beyond the political system in using its instruments of police or army.

The right use of force by the state is also governed by the principle of minimal force, which means the use of the minimum force necessary to deter, restrain, or, if necessary, contain violence, and to preserve public order. It has been argued that the doctrine of minimal force is only really effective in circumstances where "there is a relatively high degree of political consensus and social cohesion, co-operation and discipline. It fails to work where large sections of the population deny the legitimacy of

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<sup>10</sup> Paul Wilkinson, *Terrorism and the Liberal State*, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1977, p. 41.

the state, and where many view the police and army as alien, hostile and oppressive<sup>11</sup>.

It is important to remember that the state preceded democracy by some four or five centuries. External security, internal law enforcement, finance management and later, control over communications were the state's functions. These functions were inherited by the new regimes when states became democratic, for power and authority are necessary even in a democratic state. The sovereignty of a state – the state's capacity to exercise its functions – will be limited by its inability to act autonomously in its external relations, as well as by its inability to carry out its internal administrative functions. It is for this reason that the state will usually train armed forces and develop relationships with other states, and will impose its law upon its citizens within the state. A state unable to maintain law, unable to order its affairs in the way it should, ceases to be a state. The modern state is a set of institutions comprising the legislature, executive, central and local administration, judiciary, police and armed forces.

In one respect, democracy transforms the fundamental problem of sovereignty, which, as Frank Bealey observes, is complicated by the government becoming more dependent on the citizens.

If they (the governed) withdraw their support sovereignty is weakened; it is strengthened if they desire to defend and consolidate it. How much the citizens wish to uphold their state depends on how much legitimacy they accord it. A state is not likely to be viable if its subjects do not regard its rule as legitimate. In the democratic state there are reasons why legitimacy is both more, and less, likely to be granted. Democracy encourages criticism of authority and opposition to government. This situation may commend itself to many who feel more emancipated under democracy than any other form of government. Consequently,

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<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 44.

democracy may command more support than any other form of government. (It depends on how much people value democratic freedoms.) On the other hand, freedom to criticize may result in decline in respect and prestige; an unsuccessful democratic government may lose much of its legitimacy as a result of failure<sup>12</sup>.

Thus, the success of government in the modern democratic state is closely tied to the question of the state's legitimacy.

### ***Democracy in Canada: Specific Characteristics***

The Dominion of Canada was the first political community to combine federalism with British-type parliamentary institutions, with what some have called the "Westminster model"<sup>13</sup>. The Canadian system of government is firmly federal because of territorially-bounded differences in government, economy and society; it is also cabinet-parliamentary by the settled habits and preferences of its citizens.

There are two important levels of government in a federal system : a central government which controls matters of concern to the whole country, and provincial governments which control matters of concern to the individual provinces or states. There are thus two sets of laws in a federation, central and provincial, which render it a complicated system of government, and for this reason federations have been established only where it seemed necessary, to obtain union

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<sup>12</sup> Frank Bealey, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

<sup>13</sup> Donald Smiley, *Canada in Question : Federalism in the Eighties*, Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1980, p. 9.

Geography, which has divided the vast country of Canada into at least five regions, differing in population, climate, and industries, is an important factor in the choice of a federal system for Canada. History, however, also plays its part, for each province was established in different ways and by different groups. Quebec, which traces its history back to the beginning of the seventeenth century, offers the most important example of the influence of history in Canada's federal system. When Quebec became a part of the British Empire in 1763, the French Canadians continued under British rule to have freedom of worship, their own methods of education under the control of the Church, their own language, and customs of living. Entering Confederation in 1867, the questions of language, education, and civil law were left under provincial control, and the French-Canadian leaders who favoured Confederation felt that they would be better able to protect these special interests in a federal system than in any other way.

Canada drew the parliamentary system from Britain, and many of its ideas of federalism from the United States, but the country had to adapt these examples to its own purposes. The Canadian system of government developed in several overlapping stages: the establishment of representative assemblies; the establishment of cabinet or "responsible" government; the establishment of federalism in 1867, and the development toward full self-government, when Canada gradually took over responsibility for such matters as treaty making.

The American constitution is always called "written" and can only be amended by a special process, whereas the British constitution is always said to be "unwritten" and refers to all the practices and traditions of their parliamentary system. In Canada, the word constitution is used both ways. The *federal* part of Canada's federal-and-parliamentary system is carefully described in the British North America Act which was passed in 1867 and can only be changed by special amendment; while the *parliamentary* part, like the English constitution, is to be found in various laws and customs. The British North America Act attempted to solve the most difficult and important problem in a federal system : how to divide power between the central and provincial governments in such a way that each will have its own rights and authority, but that all will work together in the general interest. Briefly put, control was given to the federal government over matters of national concern, and to the provincial governments over matters of local and private concern. In some cases, like immigration, power was given to both, but in cases of uncertainty the powers of the Dominion were intended to be wide and ample, while those of the provinces were limited.

Bilingualism is another distinguishing feature in the Canadian system of government. Canada was established as a federation in 1867 predominantly because of cultural duality. Most of the English-speaking Fathers of Confederation from Canada and the Maritime colonies would have preferred a unitary system, but the French Canadian Conservatives could not agree to any political settlement which would have placed those powers they deemed necessary to the integrity of their cultural and linguistic community

in the hands of the majority in the new Dominion. However, among the Fathers from Upper Canada there were those too who wished to separate out some of those matters where the two historic communities had come into conflict since the Act of Union. Although such leaders as George Brown seem not to have wanted a co-ordinate division of legislative powers between Parliament and the provincial legislatures, they clearly anticipated the benefits of removing certain matters of previous English-French contention from the jurisdiction of the projected Dominion government. Provincialist influences were also at work in the Maritime Provinces.

A bilingual state is characterized by a wide variety of bilingual institutions, designed to guarantee that citizens are not disadvantaged because they belong to a minority linguistic group. Such institutions may include the legislature, the courts, the civil service, and the schools; but these institutions can have many different forms in different bilingual countries. In Book One of the Laurendeau-Dunton Royal Commission Report on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Canada is recognised as a unique bilingual state for many reasons: the world-wide prestige and influence of English and French, the isolation and the minority situation of the French-speaking community in North America, and the deep roots of the French language in Quebec and in Canada. "The two languages and the two communities which speak them coexist in this country under conditions duplicated nowhere else<sup>14</sup>".

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<sup>14</sup> Hugh R. Innis, *Bilingualism and Biculturalism: An abridged version of the Royal Commission Report*, Ottawa: McClelland and Stewart, 1973, p. 8.



Within the provinces, both Anglophones and Francophones live in some cases as a majority, in some cases as a minority. Every province demonstrates the linguistic complexity of Canada : from Newfoundland and British Columbia where the French-speaking minorities are small, to New Brunswick where the minority is significant, and Quebec where the English mother tongue is the minority. The historical development of linguistic rights in Canada has characterized the political and constitutional history of the country almost from the beginning.

Also important is the ethnic dimension in Canada and the effect of immigrants on the linguistic composition of the Canadian population. The Laurendeau-Dunton Royal Commission notes in its observation of the Canadian community in the 1960s that :

...those of British origin generally speak English; 9 out of 10 people of French origin retain French as their mother tongue; those of other origins tend progressively to adopt English, except in Quebec where the situation is more complex. In fact, about one out of six Canadians no longer speaks the language of his forbears. Of those who changed languages, 93 per cent are English-speaking today<sup>15</sup>.

Thus, the situation of the Canadian community as observed by the authors of the Royal Commission, was that linguistic duality remained its basic characteristic, despite the constant increase in numbers of Canadians of other ethnic origins.

### Democracy and Quebec

"Historically, French Canadians have not really believed in democracy for themselves; and English Canadians have not really wanted it for others<sup>16</sup>". According to

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<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 10.

<sup>16</sup> Pierre Trudeau, "Some Obstacles to Democracy in Quebec" (1958), in *Federalism and the French Canadians*, Toronto: Macmillan, 1968, p. 103.

Pierre Elliott Trudeau, French Canadians had benefited from democracy without desiring it or having to fight for it. His opinion was that they had corrupted the parliamentary system by converting this democratic tool into a nationalist tool, since racial and religious survival was their first concern. Trudeau's overall conclusion in his article "Some Obstacles to Democracy in Quebec"(1958) was that the nationalist tradition had dominated the liberal democratic tradition during the entire nineteenth century. He did not spare English democracy either, listing example after example of abuses of democracy committed in believed superiority over the Canadiens. "Such examples of the use of majorities as a bludgeon to 'convince' minorities should remind us that if French Canadians made the mistake of using democracy as a tool of ethnic warfare, English Canadians offered them the wherewithal to learn<sup>17</sup>".

This article was part of the criticism of the generation of intellectuals writing at the time of the journal *Cité libre*, published from 1950 to 1967. As mentioned in the previous discussion of the period's ideological debate, *Cité libre* examined the prevailing political culture in Quebec, calling for freedom of expression and putting the democracy of the era on trial. Their indignation was easily aroused during the reign of Maurice Duplessis (1936-39; 1944-59), in response to what these intellectuals saw as electoral corruption, parliamentary authoritarianism, and favouritism. Some believe that the representation Quebecers have today of their democratic tradition is in large part based

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<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 118.

on the vision of democracy conveyed by these intellectuals. More recent research has engaged to correct what has been called this "short-sighted vision of Quebec history"<sup>18</sup>.

For some *Cité libre* intellectuals, representation of the democratic tradition in Quebec included the firmly-entrenched attitude of the Roman Catholic Church toward democracy. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, students in seminary colleges learned that power in society did not derive from the people but from God, and that the most valid form of government was not democracy but constitutional monarchy by divine right, or at least monarchy where the aristocracy could act as a counterbalance to Parliament. "Christ the King and the Pope as King; on no account must Church and State be separated, or religious power and political power, the sacred and the profane, become dissociated from one another"<sup>19</sup>. These intellectuals emphasized that it took the Quebec Church two centuries to adjust to democracy. *Cité libre*, Fathers O'Neill and Gérard Dion (*L'immoralité politique dans la Province de Québec*, 1956), Frère Untel (1960), and other authors all worked at exposing clericalism and the intrusion of the Church into spheres outside its authority.

Recent historiography has introduced a more equitable assessment of the French Canadian's attitude towards democracy and parliamentary government. Fernande Roy, for example, traces back much farther than the period of *Cité libre* the ideological debate between the supporters of a liberal, democratic society and those who fought to preserve

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<sup>18</sup> Fernande Roy, *Histoire des idéologies au Québec aux XIXe et XXe siècles*, Boréal, 1993, p. 101.

<sup>19</sup> Yvan Lamonde, "The Democratic Thread in Quebec, from the 18th Century to the Present", in *Forces*, no. 96, winter 1991-92, p. 28.

the traditional, hierarchical society<sup>20</sup>. Active liberals were the heirs of the Parti canadien, which became the Parti patriote in 1827, and gave liberalism a new start after the Union of 1840. Gathering in the famous centre known as the Institut canadien (1844-85), and active in the papers *l'Avenir* and *le Pays*, and in the Legislative Assembly of United Canada, they were the promoters and defenders of democracy. As an elective association, the Institut canadien was a veritable school of democracy for a democratic society<sup>21</sup>. A century before *Cité libre*, these liberals believed in education as "a corollary to sovereignty of the people" and as a guarantee that "men born with the same rights (may) remain equal<sup>22</sup>".

For over a quarter of a century, popular sovereignty represented the centre of these liberals' thought and action. In recognising the connection between democracy and knowledge, educational institutions were criticized for being "in complete and absolute opposition to the only political and responsible principles which will henceforth govern the world. Young people's minds are still being moulded in a false direction, and liberalism, that is, the republican concept, is still being represented to them as dangerous and irreligious<sup>23</sup>". The clericalism exposed in 1950 in *Cité libre* was understood in the same terms in 1850.

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<sup>20</sup> Fernande Roy, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 39-41.

<sup>22</sup> Yvan Lamonde, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 29.

Fernande Roy points out that the intellectuals writing for *Cité libre* tended to think of themselves as the first Quebeckers to discover democracy and liberalism. Recent historiography, however, substantiates representation of a liberal tradition in Quebec which, whatever the difficulties experienced at certain times, nevertheless constituted a significant historical thread.

#### Quebec and Canadian Federalism

At the end of the 1950s, a new society was developing, one which called for a "Quebec state" to take responsibility for health, the family, housing, education and culture, work relations and economic development planning. Though the critics of the Duplessis government did not always agree on how to improve on the current policies, they did agree on the need to entrust these responsibilities to the state.

As mentioned above in the discussion about the "Quiet Revolution", an emerging French-Canadian middle class began in the 1960s to challenge the English-speaking interests of Quebec commercial and economic life, using the state as an instrument of collective action. The state began to step into areas traditionally controlled by the Catholic Church, and into economics, by creating public businesses managed by Francophones, and into politics, by setting itself against the presence of the federal state in certain areas.

In his analysis of the dialectic between Quebec political parties and society, Réjean Pelletier looks at the question of the Quebec state's place in the Canadian federal system, as well as its place at the centre of Quebec itself. In the internal dimension, which he sees as being a prominent question of the period 1960-1968, the Quebec state concerned itself with recovering control of certain areas overtaken by Ottawa, with managing competently its own areas of jurisdiction, and with obtaining the fiscal powers necessary for facing up to its obligations. Pelletier situates this period in a "Quebec" perspective, as opposed to the period 1968-1976, which had a much bigger "Canadian" impact. The external dimension, the place of the Quebec state in Canadian federation, is the question which set supporters of federalism against supporters for an independent Quebec.

Like the Lesage liberals, the Union Nationale, led to a narrow victory by Daniel Johnson in 1966, recommended special status for Quebec and a certain international visibility. Though the Union Nationale did use the slogan, "Égalité ou indépendance", the independent movement had its roots elsewhere. Both small groups and structured associations, such as the Rassemblement pour l'indépendance nationale, which was influenced by the writers of the socialist review *Parti pris*, shared the common wish to see Quebec separated from the Canadian federation.

With the establishment of the 'Mouvement souveraineté-association' in 1967, and the Parti québécois the following year, René Lévesque offered to the non-socialist, non-

violent majority of Quebecers a democratic route to independence. His social democratic program actually brought together the bulk of the independent forces, which was made possible by the ambiguity of the concept of sovereignty-association<sup>24</sup>. Both the radical supporters of an independent Quebec and the supporters of a decentralized federalism could accept the idea of a new political community which would be associated with what remains of Canada in some form or other of economic union.

At its founding convention in October, 1968, the Parti québécois adopted a program which suggested a severed political tie between Quebec and the rest of Canada and a negotiated common market. A main goal of the nationalist Parti québécois at this time was to define the Quebec state and to determine precisely its place in the Canadian political system. French-speaking Canadians were concentrated in Quebec, and the desire was surfacing within this collective for a strong national state which would be recognized at the international level. Lévesque's belief was that a state which was both sovereign and associated could assure the development of a liberal, inventive society, in the cultural field as well as in economics and social matters. What also characterizes the party was the belief that state interventionism must before all else benefit the collective, which was contrary to the emphasis of Trudeau's government on individual rights.

As for the supporters of federalism, Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Gérard Pelletier and Jean Marchand headed to Ottawa in 1965 to defend the view that it is in the best interest

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<sup>24</sup> Paul-André Linteau, René Durocher, et Jean-Claude Robert, *Histoire du Québec contemporain, T. II*, Montréal, Boréal, 1989, p. 710.

of Quebecers to stay a part of the federation rather than to reinforce the strength of the provincial state. Pierre Trudeau formulated his view of Canadian federalism and as Prime Minister, was in a position to work towards its implementation. As we have seen, politics within Quebec and throughout Canada became polarized on this issue. The major philosophical axis of Trudeau's political views is what he saw as a clash between liberalism and nationalism : "Liberal and nationalist values are diametrically opposed and the latter are incompatible with Canadian federalism<sup>25</sup>". He consistently opposed any form of "special status" for Quebec, which would allow the province a more extensive range of powers than those possessed by other provinces. Claude Ryan, a supporter of the special status alternative, had suggested a very extensive transfer of constitutional powers from Ottawa to Quebec, in recognition of "diversities which are so pronounced that they are incompatible within a system that aims at uniformity<sup>26</sup>".

The option favoured by the Trudeau federalists was the "bilingual and bicultural alternative", which suggests that:

...to survive Canada must become in some fuller sense than at present a genuinely bilingual and bicultural country. Such reforms, it is argued, or hoped, will attenuate the pressures toward autonomism in Quebec as Francophones develop allegiances and interests within the broader Canadian framework<sup>27</sup>.

The bilingual and bicultural policies called for absolute equality of the two languages at the federal level, and determined to equalize the opportunities for advancement in the federal service for both language groups. Trudeau's opinion is that the federal state is the

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<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 155.

<sup>26</sup> Claude Ryan, "The Possible Contents of Special Status for Quebec", in *Contemporary Issues in Canadian Politics*, Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1970, p. 42.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 159.



"product of reason in politics" because it is the result of a compromise or a pact which aimed at overcoming cultural particularities. It was the Trudeau government which gave birth to the policy of multiculturalism in Canada<sup>28</sup>. The governments of Quebec which held power during this period of debate did not place a high priority on this federalist alternative, being relatively little concerned with the French factor elsewhere in Canada.

Thus, vastly different views of Quebec and its relationship with Canada emerge from the discussions of the post-1960 period. Much constitutional debate animated and divided Canadian politics during these years. The bilingual and bicultural alternative which attracted Trudeau was recommended by a Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, set up after the election of the first Pearson minority government in 1963, at the suggestion of the prominent French-Canadian intellectual, André Laurendeau. But where the privileged community for Trudeau was the multicultural state, for Laurendeau, it was the national society. He saw in the commission an instrument for strengthening and preserving French-Canadian language and culture through the application of existing federal constitutional powers. He put forward the so-called "two nations" argument, which recognized in Canada two nations with two centuries of shared history, linked by common concerns<sup>29</sup>. The key consequence of the Laurendeau-Dunton Commission was the federal Official Languages Act of 1969, which modified the BNA Act to give the status of "official language" to both English and French.

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<sup>28</sup> Michael Oliver, "Laurendeau et Trudeau : leurs opinions sur le Canada", in Raymond Hudon et Réjean Pelletier (dir.), *L'engagement intellectuel*, Saint-Foy, Université Laval, 1991, p. 347, 355.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 353.

From 1960 onward there was a new round of federal-provincial discussions on an amending formula. These discussions culminated in 1964, in the agreement of all eleven governments on what was called the Fulton-Favreau Formula. Jean Lesage later had to withdraw in the face of complaints that the new formula would introduce a new and unnecessary element of rigidity into the constitution before Quebec's aspirations had been effected. The rigidities of the proposed amending procedure became for Quebec "une camisole de force", a straight-jacket, in the sense that even the smallest of the provinces could frustrate Quebec's hopes for change<sup>30</sup>.

The federal response was to proceed over the next few years to try to assemble a package of constitutional proposals for the provinces, including "amending machinery"<sup>31</sup>. Ottawa also proposed a constitutionally-entrenched Charter of what it classified as political, legal, egalitarian and linguistic rights. The belief was that such a measure "would not only give more effective safeguards but would also remove at one stroke the existing ambiguities of the division of legislative powers related to human rights"<sup>32</sup>. This new package of federal constitutional proposals came to be known as the Victoria Charter of 1971. Various nationalist groups in Quebec opposed the Charter quickly after the end of the Victoria meeting, and it was not accepted. Continuing objections existed in Quebec to any amending formula which would put Quebec's future constitutional position at the discretion of other provinces.

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<sup>30</sup> Smiley, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

<sup>31</sup> Edward McWhinney, *Quebec and the Constitution 1960-1978*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979, p. 47.

<sup>32</sup> Donald V. Smiley, *Canada in Question: Federalism in the Eighties*, Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd., 1980, p. 17.

The failure of the Victoria Charter brought the process of comprehensive constitutional review to a temporary halt. In 1972, the attitude was resigned to the failure of the most recent attempt at reform :

The federal position is that the initiative now rests with Quebec if constitutional reform is to be resumed and on this basis there may be a continuing discussion involving either Quebec and Ottawa alone or all eleven governments on Quebec proposals of a very specific kind. However, the failures of 1964 and 1971 have undoubtedly attenuated whatever hopes there were in governmental circles either that a major English-French accommodation might emerge through constitutional review or that agreement could be reached on a new and allegedly better constitution that the one we now have<sup>33</sup>.

Important to the discussion of democracy, particularly in the context of the Canadian federal system in the 1960s and 1970s, is the issue of crisis government. The complex division of legislative powers between two levels of government which characterizes federalism is obviously inappropriate in times of domestic and international crisis. In August of 1914, the War Measures Act was enacted and has since remained as a federal statute subject to being brought into effect by proclamation of the Governor-in-Council when, in his judgement, there exists "war, invasion, or insurrection, real or apprehended". The Act gives the federal cabinet discretion not only to declare the coming into being of such an emergency but also its passing. When the Act is proclaimed in force the cabinet is given almost unlimited powers to cope with the situation. The cabinet has authority to pass whatever regulations it deems necessary for the "security, defence, peace, order and welfare of Canada," including such measures as censorship, arrest, detention, and deportation. A series of provisions conferred on the police enhances powers of arrest, as well as powers of search and seizure. Another series of provisions

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<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 50.

abrogate due process of law, by limiting the citizen's right to counsel. Under the new regulations, the Crown does not have to charge an arrested person until seven days after his arrest, and the attorney-general could, before seven days pass, order the accused to be detained for a further 21 days.

Although the War Measures Act mentions insurrection, until the Quebec crisis of 1970 Canadians had regarded the Act in terms of the country's involvement in international conflict. However, at 4:00 am on Friday, October 16 of that year, the federal government invoked the War Measures Act and issued the Public Order Regulations under its authority. The Regulations declared to be illegal 'Le Front de Libération du Québec' (FLQ) and any group advocating force or crime as a means of accomplishing governmental change in Canada. The federal government's official reason for invoking the War Measures rested on two letters to Prime Minister Trudeau, one written by Mayor Jean Drapeau of Montreal, the other by Premier Bourassa. Additional powers to the state were sought to cope with sedition and insurrection. No one claimed at the time or with any conviction thereafter that these powers were needed to track down the kidnappers. It was to meet the threat to institutions of governments in Quebec that the War Measures Act was invoked.

The Regulations were replaced by the Public Order Temporary Measures Act on December 3, 1970, an enactment which shortened the period of detention without charge and required stronger proof of belonging to an unlawful political organization. Despite

opposition from the government of Quebec, this Act lapsed on April 30, 1971, and Canada returned to a regime where illegal political activity was defined entirely by the normal processes of law.

The terrorist activity and the use of emergency powers continue to preoccupy the country, 26 years after the crisis of October 1970. Very basic questions have been raised about the real course of events, the responsibility for those events, the propriety and prudence of suspending civil liberties, and the motives of all the actors involved. The crucial point of concern here is the relationship of the events and decisions of this crisis to the Canadian democratic system. Democracy in Canada was put to the test, and the varying reactions to the terrorism and to the governmental response will provide interesting insight into visions of the country's democracy held by its citizens.

### ***Democracy put to the test : the October crisis, 1970***

According to author Thomas Berger, the October Crisis of 1970 was "the end of Canadian innocence"<sup>34</sup>. He calls Trudeau and his advisors to account for proclaiming the War Measures Act without sufficient cause, for the stringency of the measures taken under the authority of the Act, and for the perpetuation of those measures by the enactment of the Public Order Act. On the strength of these measures, the police in Quebec arrested hundreds of their fellow citizens who constituted no threat to the province or to Canada, who had not committed criminal acts of any kind, and who were

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<sup>34</sup> Thomas Berger, *Fragile Freedoms: Human Rights and Dissent in Canada*, Toronto: Clarke, Irwin and Co., 1981, p. 190.

not in any way connected with the FLQ. The conclusion drawn by Berger is that these arrests were made arbitrarily, and that the interrogation of all of these people did not reveal any evidence that an insurrection was imminent. "The whole exercise reveals how unwise it is to have such extraordinary power easily available to any government"<sup>35</sup>.

Other writers also regret the indifference of the people of Canada to the arbitrary arrests of fellow citizens. Haggart and Golden quoted Robert Stanfield in their work, *Rumours of War*:

The plain truth is that most Canadians did not care whether or not there really was an apprehended insurrection. They did not like what was going on in Quebec and they approved of their federal Government taking strong measures to deal with the situation; if the Government had no tools other than the war Measures Act, then by all means let the Government use it. To many if not most Canadians any questioning of the invocation of the Act was unpatriotic even before the murder of Pierre Laporte.

What is most significant and revealing is not that the government of the day resorted to such a measure - another government might have done that, too - but that in a state of concern the public enthusiastically approved the measure, and since then has never wanted any accounting for either the claims of an apprehended insurrection or the behaviour of security and police forces towards the citizens whose basic legal rights were suspended<sup>36</sup>.

How can the terrorists of October 1970 and the War Measures Act be fitted into our understanding of the Canadian democratic system ? The justifications of those in power suggested that the terrorist acts put the crisis outside the bound of the normal democratic process. The crucial questions are how the Canadian system permits the

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<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 209.

<sup>36</sup> Robert Standfield, quoted in Haggart and Golden, *Rumours of War*, Toronto: James Lorimer & Co., 1979, p. iv.

public will to be expressed, how clearly and immovably the line is drawn between the legitimate and the illegitimate expression of dissent, and how the community allows itself to reply to acts of dissent which are considered to be beyond what is legitimate. The difficult question is not whether opposition or dissent should be permitted at all – democratic theory by definition allows for a range of legitimate dissent and the opportunity to change governments by peaceful means, according to established rules. Canadians are familiar with the normal right of opposition in the parliamentary system. The question is, what are the proper limits of dissent, what kind of opposition is not permissible – and why ? And also, what are the proper limits of action which governments may take against legitimate and against illegitimate dissent ?

Prime Minister Trudeau used the term "parallel power" to describe what he saw as a challenge to the political power held by the Quebec and Canadian governments and the state they represented. For him, that kind of challenge to established authority was illegitimate, and justified a very severe official response. The prime minister said that in theory his response to the challenge could go "to any distance". The actual response was the invocation of the War Measures Act for the first time in Canada without the excuse of war. What the prime minister was claiming was that because his government held power legitimately, and because the state could legitimately act outside of the democratic system, it could therefore act in any way it wished in dealing with the crisis. The use of force, legitimate violence, is a property of the democratic state.

In *Bleeding Hearts... Bleeding Country*, Denis Smith makes clear that he was an opponent of the response chosen by the governments of Canada and Quebec. He challenges the theoretical position taken by Pierre Trudeau that because there exist in Canada effective electoral mechanisms, it is not acceptable to challenge governments except peacefully through the electoral process :

Mr. Trudeau, like Mr. Bourassa, had proposed a fair weather theory of democracy inadequate to the occasion. The fact was that an element of the public had rejected the democratic process and resorted to coercion to achieve its objectives. Faced with that challenge, the federal prime minister also became a Hobbesian absolutist rather than a democrat. The normal rules were suspended; force would now meet force, and the stronger would win. Fair weather commitment to electoral democracy, and foul weather commitment to force, were the two elements of the official position, riding roughshod in tandem through a more complicated traditional theory of democracy in Canada<sup>37</sup>.

Smith's main concern is the apparent ease with which Trudeau contemplated the suspension of basic liberties and their judicial guarantees. "Democracy is exceedingly fragile if the liberties on which it depends can be suspended whenever a small group of determined men choose to harass it<sup>38</sup>". The understanding of democracy which allows for such an easy resort to emergency measures is, according to Smith, not able to sustain democracy in a period of prolonged internal crisis.

Thomas Berger agrees that the safety of the state depends not on the assumption of extraordinary governmental powers, but on the conviction of the people that the right to dissent is essential to the life and health of the state. "Firmness is better shown – and often greater courage is required to show firmness – in the defence of civil liberties, by

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<sup>37</sup> Denis Smith, *Bleeding Hearts ... Bleeding Country*, Edmonton: M.G. Hurtig Ltd., 1971, p. 88.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 88.



reminding the electorate of the need to distinguish between sedition and dissent, and of the difference between criminal acts established by evidence and guilt by association<sup>39</sup>". He insists that the Constitution should reflect a faith in laws, not in those who govern; it should reflect a faith in fundamental freedoms, not a willingness to give those who govern the power to repeal them.

These expressions of concern for the interruption in Canadian democracy reveal a common attitude found in many of the books and articles written after the crisis of October 1970. It has been often repeated that the general reaction of Canadian citizens at the time of events was of a much different nature: strong support for tough government action in the face of terrorism. The present analysis of newspaper coverage during the month of October 1970 was undertaken in an attempt to discover the predominant attitudes of editorialists, journalists, and the public as the crisis evolved. It is hypothesized that readers of *La Presse* and *The Toronto Daily Star* newspapers were exposed to different editorial attitudes towards democracy and different front page emphasis of the political events, both of which have significant influence in fashioning the collective understanding of Canadian democracy and its relevance for the individual.

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<sup>39</sup> Thomas R. Berger, *op. cit.*, p. 210-211.

### ***Research Design : Choice of Newspapers and Time Period***

Part of the strategy of comparative analysis across cultures in communication research is the use of an analytical model whose elements are structure, culture and situation. In the foreword to *Communication and Culture : A Comparative Approach*, Maxwell McCombs underlines the methodological argument for holding constant social structure in order to better understand what differences can be attributed to culture or to individual situations<sup>40</sup>.

With the goal of identifying cultural and political difference in newspaper coverage, the newspapers chosen for this comparative analysis were ones which allowed for stability in structure. *La Presse*, boasting the largest circulation of the Montreal daily written press in 1970, was the most influential daily newspaper of the most influential city in Quebec. *The Toronto Daily Star* provides a parallel situation, being the newspaper of the largest circulation in Canada in 1970, and native to the city of most economic power and influence. Thus, the choice of newspapers eliminates the need to account for differences in communications flow between national metropolises and smaller communities.

Similarly, the choice of two newspapers which target a similar audience holds constant the social structure. Unlike the "highbrow" daily press, as has been named *Le Devoir* of Montreal and *The Globe and Mail* of Toronto, these two widely circulating

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<sup>40</sup> Maxwell McCombs, "Foreword" to *Communication and Culture: A Comparative Approach*, Edelstein, Ito, and Kepplinger (eds), New York: Longman, p. xv.

newspapers are directed at an audience who seeks more description than explanation, more events than analysis. However, they are not on a level with the sensationalist press who consider only the shocking and the scandalous to be newsworthy. *La Presse* and *The Toronto Star* target a heterogeneous public who find among the pages a great quantity of subjects answering their multiple interests. Difference in attitude of the editorialists, published letters, and opinion pieces should be easier to interpret given the similar social structure of the two dailies.

In a final reflection on the choice of newspapers, it should also be pointed out that the concept of ideological control of information from owners and interested business or political powers is not foreign to either *La Presse* or *The Toronto Daily Star*. Both papers are home to the struggle between the effort to maintain at all costs the dominant ideology of a capitalist press, and the conviction to uphold the principle of freedom of information. This shared phenomenon means that in the comparison of opinion by the method of content analysis, there exists no need to account for differences between newspapers under ownership control and those that exercise more economic and ideological independence.

Originally conceived as a comparison of FLQ and democracy related coverage in two newspapers throughout a whole year, the study was focused to a more in-depth look over the period of one month. After the preliminary reading of both dailies from September 1970 to the expiry of the Public Order Act in April 1971, it was discovered

that the most crucial month, October 1970, offered in itself a rich amount of comparative material. Instead of an exhaustive overview, the scope of the research was drastically reduced to one month to allow for a deeper study of opinions towards democracy at this troubled time.

In the many accounts of the October 1970 events, the same period of 17 days is often recognized as constituting the actual crisis: Monday, October 5th to Wednesday, October 21st. Appendix B lists the important developments of each of these acute days of the crisis<sup>41</sup>. The upheaval and repercussions – both political and emotional – continued for many months after these 17 days; for some, the discussion continues still, 26 years later. But for the purpose of this study, analysis did not go beyond October 31st, 1970.

### ***Methodology***

The choice of method for the empirical analysis was content analysis, using quantitative as well as qualitative judgements, as they supplement each other. The unit of measurement was the *theme*, a single assertion about a subject, as it was the most useful unit of content to use in research dealing with attitudes and opinions.

The material covered included five separate types of article : front page news stories (reporting fact); other news stories (reporting fact, found on any page other than Page 1); editorials (opinion expressed by editorialists); letters to the editor (opinion of

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<sup>41</sup> Appendix B has been borrowed from Arthur Siegel's 1974 study, as it offers a thorough chronology of developments.

readers printed in letter form); and special opinion pieces (full articles expressing opinion, written by 'intellectuals', political or community figures, experts, scholars, etc.). For both of the sample dailies, the themes were recorded for all types of articles, as well as secondary themes to allow for nuance. The articles were categorized according to their main theme, but nuance did allow for more accurate interpretation in certain comparisons.

The most important part of a research design is the selection and definition of categories, the "files" in which the units (themes) are to be classified. O. R. Holsti once stated the general principles of category construction as follows: "...categories should *reflect the purposes of the research*, be *exhaustive*, be *mutually exclusive*, *independent*, and be derived from a *single classification principle*"<sup>42</sup>. Several readings of the data allowed for the familiarity of the issues necessary for constructing the categories. Appendix A lists and describes the categories used for the empirical analysis, with each category broken down to better illustrate the organization. The following chapter will demonstrate the interpretation and comparison of these classified groupings of opinion.

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<sup>42</sup> Ole R. Holsti, *Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities*, Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing, 1969, p. 95.

## CHAPTER III

### TREATMENT OF RESULTS AND FINDINGS

#### *Treatment of the Information*

In the interest of evaluating the interaction of press and politics, a study was undertaken in 1974 which also recognized the FLQ crisis as an excellent vehicle for finding out more about the "Canadian reality" as presented by French and English newspapers<sup>1</sup>. To draw a profile of Canadian newspaper coverage during the critical days of the October crisis, a representative weighted sample of 22 dailies was used. Arthur Siegel examined the versions of realities presented to French and English readers using a multi-dimensional content analysis. A general conclusion of Siegel's study was that the coverage of French- and English-language daily newspapers emphasized different themes, were different in style, were editorially diverse, and had different visions of federalism. "French and English newspapers provided different 'mappings of reality' of Canada's federal framework for their respective audiences, thus providing a political communications dimension for what Hugh McLennan has called 'two solitudes' in the broader social context<sup>2</sup>".

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<sup>1</sup> Arthur Siegel, *Canadian Newspaper Coverage of the FLQ Crisis : A Study on the Impact of the Press on Politics*, PhD thesis, Montreal: McGill University, department of political science, 1974.

<sup>2</sup> Arthur Siegel, *Politics and the Media in Canada*, Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1983, p. 210.

The 1974 research provides an interesting comparative reference. Though the present study deals with the same emergency situation in Canada, it differs in scope and orientation, dealing with two dailies only and focusing on attitudes towards democracy. This variation in perspective accounts for the significant difference in findings between the two studies. In the choosing of these two newspapers, we do not attempt to reflect the opinion of all of Canada, merely to compare the two most widely read dailies in the metropolises of Montreal and Toronto, one written in French, the other in English. The two papers diverge from the trends established by Siegel's overview of Canadian press coverage, which is not totally unwarranted. Siegel himself signalled the difference between the large metropolis dailies close to the action and the more hard-lined, more distant papers in the rest of Canada.

A total of 23 editions of *La Presse* and 23 editions of *The Toronto Daily Star* appeared with coverage of the FLQ crisis over the course of the month. Special editions on Monday, October 12th, Thanksgiving Day, were published at each operation. For consistency, the final edition of both dailies was the one read.

Although space profile was not an element included in the comparative analysis, mention must be made of the different style of letters published in the two papers. In a raw frequency count, it appears that readers of the Toronto paper are much more prone to write to the editor than those who read the French paper. Letters addressed to *La Presse* from its readers are on average much longer than the ones appearing in *The*

*Toronto Daily Star*, which are often printed as excerpts of one or two paragraphs. Thus there is room for many more readers to express opinions on the English public opinion page, though in less depth, and this accounts for what appears to be greater interest in participation.

Special contributions from experts and high profile figures outside of the newspaper editorial staff were considered important in the study of opinion found in the pages of these dailies, and they have been grouped as "opinion pieces". Views of democracy, the state, and the emergency situation held by historians, sociologists, media analysts, professors of political science, and such others have been recorded and organized according to the same three axes of analysis as the editorials and letters. The comparison value is small, however, for during this month, little by way of special contribution appeared in *La Presse*, a possible consequence of the restrictions imposed by the War Measures Act. Compared to the 15 opinion pieces found in the Toronto newspaper, only 2 existed in the French data. The surprisingly low contribution could also be attributed to the apparent preference of scholars, experts and 'intellectuals' to express opinion and debate issues in the more "highbrow" newspaper of Montreal, *Le Devoir*.

### ***Findings***

The treatment of results unexpectedly delivered findings contrary to ones hypothesized at the inception of this empirical study. Expecting a strong support in the



Toronto daily for tough, immediate government response to the terrorists and an emphasis on the manhunt and military activity, instead we found a prevalent concern for the government's use of power and abrogation of civil rights, and a high count of news stories about negotiations for the hostages' safety. The Montreal daily also contradicted hypothesized findings, stressing the news theme of manhunt and the importance of maintaining law and order, instead of the expected demand for protection of civil rights. To look at these findings more closely, a start with the news articles will allow us to move from a general view to the more specific analysis of opinion.

#### News articles

In the interest of establishing a link between editorializing, agenda-setting and the news made available to readers, news coverage of the crisis events was studied for the month of October 1970. 49 news stories were found in *The Toronto Daily Star* dealing with the subject of the FLQ and surrounding issues; 21 of these articles were printed on the front page. As for *La Presse*, 180 FLQ related news stories were found, 56 of which appeared on Page One.

The themes of news stories were sorted according to a grill different than that of the editorials and letters, as these articles did not offer opinion, but reported fact. News stories were identified as front page or other news, and organized according to the main theme at the head of the story. Of interest was the revelation of which subject matters received the most attention, particularly front page attention, and the confirmation of a

believed association between editorial position and the patterns of news coverage. Table 1 is a list of news themes used in the frequency count.

**TABLE 1 : CATEGORIES FOR NEWS THEMES**

1. Civil rights
2. Social and Economic injustices
3. Police and Army Protection
4. Manhunt
5. Negotiations
6. Government dilemma of liberty vs. security
7. Federal and provincial government positions on law and order
8. Statements from official Opposition against measures
9. Public support for government action
10. Public protests against government action
11. Appeal for justification of extreme measures
12. Relationship between governments
13. Affect of crisis on political parties and the municipal election

Though this empirical analysis of *La Presse* and *The Toronto Daily Star* news stories was expected to follow the pattern of French/English differences found in the 1974 study, it was not the case. Siegel did note that there was a tendency towards similarity of outlook in the dailies in Montreal and Toronto, perceived as Canada's national metropolises, vis-à-vis the coverage in other large cities. "The rule of thumb was that coverage became more different from the French (that is, more hard-lined), the

further one moved from the crisis centre<sup>3</sup>". This similarity of coverage is the general trend our study discovered. The news articles touched on the majority of themes with equal frequency : social and economic injustices, police and army protection, government positions, public reactions and appeal for justifications, and relationships between governments. The Montreal paper did refer more often to the affect of the crisis on political parties, which was to be expected given the municipal election taking place at the time.

It is interesting to note that the *Star* printed a significantly higher percentage of articles on *negotiations* (38 % of the 49 FLQ-related news stories compared to 12 % of the 180 in *La Presse*), and a slightly lower percentage on the theme of *manhunt* (15 % compared to 17 %). One surprising result of the theme count in news coverage was the fact that no articles in the *Star* had the main theme of *civil rights* in the month of October, though it was approached indirectly. Given the editorial emphasis and the public concern revealed through letters, we expected to find a greater presence of this news theme. In contrast, a full 10 % of the 180 *La Presse* news articles addressed the theme of *civil rights* with attention to media censorship, arrests and conditions of arrest, etc. Both papers found it important to report on federal and provincial government positions (21 % *Star*, 17 % *La Presse*), but only the Montreal paper included statements from official Opposition against the War Measures Act (3 %). *La Presse* was also alone in printings articles about the government dilemma of liberty vs. security (2 %).

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<sup>3</sup> Siegel, *Politics and the Media in Canada*, p. 221.

### Front page news articles

In a separate test, the frequency of themes appearing on the front page were also counted. 21 news stories in the *Star* appeared on the front page; 56 in *La Presse*. It is argued that Page One is the most important page in a newspaper, and it is here that the reader supposedly learns, at a glance, the significant developments with the lead stories. Space profile, images, and headline size are all important tools for measuring importance of a story, but our interest is with theme appearance.

A large percentage of stories (76 % of the 21 crisis-related front page articles) appearing on the front page of *The Toronto Daily Star* represented two themes only : negotiations and government positions on law and order. Only a small minority (19 % of these 21) followed military and police action and the hunt for the FLQ terrorists. Given the importance of the impact of the front page, this editorial decision in layout could have resulted in an increased public concern for the liberation of Pierre Laporte and James Cross, even if it meant not punishing the FLQ for the crimes they had committed. Keeping the stories of the hunt and the show of military force off the front page could have been an attempt by the editor/producer/owner to steer readers away from an aggressive desire for punishment, which would have worked against their editorial position of an undemocratic use of governmental force.

In comparison, 25 % of the 56 front page FLQ stories in *La Presse* were accounts of the manhunt and police activity. The fact that the army was present in the streets of

Montreal and that the terrorists were at large in the same city easily accounts for the greater presence of these themes on the front page. An equal amount of front page space in the French-language daily was accorded to government positions on law and order, and the affect of the crisis on the municipal election (each subject accounting for 16 % of total front page FLQ news). Interestingly, *La Presse* also printed articles on the front page addressing the question of civil rights, such as arrests of citizens and control of information, amounting to 9 % of front page crisis coverage for the month of October. This subject was not often discussed in the editorial pages of the Montreal daily.

Apart from this exception, the results reflect the relationship between the editorial focus of attention and the themes of front page emphasis in the news content. Given that the editorial content is a reflection of viewpoints of the publishers and editors, it is logical that the layout and choice of new stories match positions of opinion in each newspaper. Let us now take a closer look at the expression of opinion in *The Toronto Daily Star* and *La Presse*.

#### Opinion articles: overview

The editorials, letters to the editor, and opinion pieces were evaluated by their base theme, with secondary theme noted in most cases to allow for the interpretation of nuance. The themes were sorted into categories which organized the analysis into three directions of opinion : A) opinions on democracy; B) opinions on the role of state; and C) opinions on the crisis roots and reasons for the response. To better interpret political

nuance, categories were arranged as much as possible in hierarchical order within each axis of analysis, from the most liberal to the most conservative of opinions. The following Table is a list of the theme categories, and Appendix A is provided to show how each principal statement encompasses a number of related opinions or sub-themes.

**TABLE 2 : CATEGORIES FOR EDITORIALS, LETTERS TO THE EDITOR, AND OPINION PIECES**

*A. Opinions on democracy*

- A1. The maintenance of civil rights is imperative, even in a time of crisis.
- A2. Government must be responsible and justify its decisions.
- A3. Continual open dialogue is necessary in a pluralistic society.
- A4. A democratic government must continually work towards social and economic equality.
- A5. The expression of dissent must be by means of electoral process.
- A6. Canadians must maintain faith in democracy and fulfil their role in the democratic social contract.
- A7. The suspension of some civil rights is acceptable in a time of crisis.

*B. Opinions on the role of state*

- B1. It is the responsibility of the state to negotiate for the lives of the hostages.
- B2. The state must avoid excessive use of force.
- B3. Government officials and the media have a responsibility to control the climate of panic.
- B4. It is the responsibility of the state to maintain law and order by the exercise of "legitimate" violence.

*C. Opinions on the crisis roots and response*

- C1. The government used the political kidnappings and the suspension of liberties to halt Quebec nationalism.
- C2. The crisis arises from social and economic injustices.
- C3. The government had no alternative but to invoke the War Measures Act given the circumstances of the crisis.
- C4. Democracy is not deep-rooted in Quebec and drastic action was not necessary.
- C5. FLQ terrorists are an extension of the separatist movement, which must be suspected and resisted in its entirety.

Treating the editorials, letters and opinion pieces together, we find a close similarity in the division of direction groups, as illustrated in the following Figure :

<b>FIGURE 1</b>	A: Opinions on democracy :	TS= 46%	LP= 51%
	B: Opinions on the role of state :	TS= 45%	LP= 42%
	C: Opinions on the crisis roots and response :	TS= 9%	LP= 7%

For the purpose of analysis, it is necessary to separate these direction groups by type of opinion article, i.e. editorial, letter, or special opinion piece.

#### Editorials: *The Toronto Daily Star*

In the month of October 1970, *The Toronto Daily Star* published 18 editorials with a primary focus of the FLQ crisis. It must be mentioned that editorials regularly expressed more than one theme, and it is the principal message or theme of the piece that determined its place in the direction groups.

Of these 18 English-language editorials, 67 % expressed opinions on democracy (A), 28 % spoke on the role of state (B), and 5 %, or one editorial, addressed the issue of the roots of the crisis (C). We shall treat each of these groups separately in order to appreciate the political leaning and to compare conservative vs. liberal tendencies with the editorials in *La Presse*.



**FIGURE 2 : The Star**


12 editorials in A group = 67%
5 editorials in B group = 28%
1 editorial in C group = 5%

*A: Opinions on democracy*

Of the 67 % of editorials in the *Star* treating the subject of democracy, many were at the liberal end of the spectrum, expressing the absolute necessity of protected civil rights in a democracy, even in the face of extreme threat (A1). Not one reached the conservative end of this grouping, being the belief that the suspension of some civil rights is acceptable in a time of crisis (A7). It is interesting to note that the most frequent primary theme was the need for justification from a responsible government (A2), with four appearances, and the importance of maintaining civil rights (A1), which was found three times. The high concentration of editorials at the liberal end of the range of Group A is most easily illustrated in graph form :

**FIGURE 3 : The Toronto Star**

A1 : 3	<b>most liberal</b>
A2 : 4	
<u>A3 : 2</u>	
<u>A4 : 1</u>	
A5 : 2	
A6 : 0	
A7 : 0	<b>most conservative</b>




*B: Opinions on the role of state*

A smaller percentage of editorials in the *Star* (28 %, or 5) offered opinion on the role of a democratic state, but the breakdown again shows a higher number of themes at the liberal end of the spectrum. Here lies the belief that it is the responsibility of the state to negotiate for the lives of the hostages (B1), whereas at the other extreme, the state is considered responsible to maintain law and order by the exercise of "legitimate" violence (B4). Of these five *Star* editorials, two pronounce it the responsibility of the state to negotiate (B1), and two challenge the state to avoid excessive use of force (B02), weighing the balance to the liberal side.

**FIGURE 4 : The Toronto Star**

B01 : 2    **most liberal**  
B02 : 2  
 B03 : 0  
 B04 : 1    **most conservative**



*C: Opinions on the crisis roots and response*

Only accounting for 5 %, or one editorial, the third direction group offers very little by way of comparison between French and English editorials. The articles which fall into the (C) group are predominantly opinion pieces or letters to the editor. The (C) themes are often used as secondary themes in editorials to support opinions on democracy or the role of state. C4, expressing that democracy is not deeply-rooted in Quebec and drastic action was necessary, was used once as a base editorial theme in *The Toronto Daily Star*, but was not supported by any repetition of similar themes.

As the study encompasses only the month of October when the events are new and interpretation is just developing, it is understandable that this direction group received less attention than the other two. A reading of the same newspapers in November and December 1970 reveals much more discussion of the reasons behind the FLQ crisis.

*Editorials: La Presse*

For the same month, *La Presse* published a total of 27 editorials related to the FLQ crisis, an understandably higher number than the Toronto daily given the proximity of the events, the threat of danger, the presence of the army, and the fact that Montreal citizens were being arrested under the War Measures Act.

Of the 27 editorials, 44 % were on the subject of democracy (A), 52 % addressed the role of state in a democracy (B), and 4 %, or one editorial, offered opinion on the crisis response (C). We witness a reversal in importance when comparing whole direction groups with the *Star* : in the English-language paper, upholding principles of democracy in Canada was considered a more important issue than the role of state in that democracy. As previously mentioned, discussions on the reasons behind the crisis had yet to become a significant topic in editorializing. The following Figure combines Figure 2 with *La Presse* percentages for the purpose of comparison.

<b>FIGURE 5 : The Star</b>	12 editorials in A group = 67%	<b>La Presse</b>	12 in A group = 44%
	5 editorials in B group = 28%		14 in B group = 52%
	1 editorial in C group = 5%		1 in C group = 4%


#### *A: Opinions on democracy*

In the case of *La Presse* editorials, the themes at the liberal end of Group A's spectrum, outlined above, were used but once in an editorial about individual liberties. The most frequently expressed theme of this group, used five times, was the call for faith in democracy and the recognition of democratic authority (A6). The Montreal editorialists also repeated the theme A5 three times, that dissent must be expressed by means of electoral process, and the theme A4 twice, that a democratic government should work towards social and democratic equality. The heavy emphasis on

unacceptable terrorist methods of reform and the need to support elected leaders in their action showed that the editorial reaction in *La Presse* was more conservative than that of *The Toronto Daily Star*. Perhaps of an already well-established conservative nature, *La Presse* did reveal itself in these editorials as being in full support of the reigning governmental powers. Figure 6 offers a visualization of these results.

**FIGURE 6 : La Presse**

A1 : 1	most liberal
A2 : 0	
A3 : 1	
A4 : 2	
A5 : 3	
A6 : 5	
A7 : 0	most conservative




*B: Opinions on the role of state*

*La Presse* editorialists show much more interest in the role of state than did those of the *Toronto Star*, addressing 52 % of all articles in this direction. Here too, there is concern for negotiation (B1) and limiting the use of force (B2), though only two editorials support each theme. More heavily weighted is the theme B3, calling for government and media control of the climate of panic (4 times). But the most important

theme according to the Montreal editorialists, appearing six times, is B4, at the conservative extreme in the direction group. This theme reflects the strong support for the role of state as protector of law and order through the exercise of 'legitimate' violence. The *Star* includes only one editorial with this as its base theme.

**FIGURE 7 : La Presse**

B01 : 2	most liberal
<u>B02 : 2</u>	
B03 : 4	
B04 : 6	most conservative



*C: Opinions on the crisis roots and response*

As was the case for the *Toronto Star*, the (C) direction group was not significantly represented in the Montreal editorials. Only one opinion was offered in this direction, an attempted explanation of the escalation of crisis events to the point of invoking the War Measures Act (C3).

Letters: *The Toronto Daily Star*

As mentioned above, the style of the public opinion page differed between the two papers : shorter letters and more space available account for the greater volume of letters to the *Star*. A total of 81 letters on the subject of democracy and the state were printed in the *Star* during the month of October, and *La Presse* published 32. The letters from the Toronto public were more often concerned with the role of state (B) (59 % of total number of letters to the editor), than with the democratic system (A) (37%). Only 4%, or three letters, concerned the contributing factors to the crisis (C).

**FIGURE 8 : The Star**

30 letters in A group = 37%
48 letters in B group = 59%
3 letters in C group = 4%


*A: Opinions on democracy*

Of the 30 letters, or 37 %, which were voicing opinion on democracy in the *Toronto Star*, a significant 14 letters were written out of concern for the threat that the War Measures Act posed for civil rights (A1). The opposite end of the spectrum was also represented, with five letters stating that the suspension of some civil rights is necessary in a time of crisis (A7). The Toronto public, in six letters, also spoke out in favour of the electoral process as the proper means of dissent, not terrorism (A5). Four letters supported the need to believe in the democratic government to protect society in return for the support of its citizens (A6). The large number of letters insisting on the

importance of Canadians' civil rights is perhaps revelatory of the agenda-setting process at work. *Star* editors emphasized this theme in the editorial comment, which may have contributed to the relevance of civil rights issues for the individual reader.

**FIGURE 9 : The Star**

A1 : 14	most liberal
A2 : 1	
A3 : 0	
A4 : 0	
A5 : 6	
A6 : 4	
A7 : 5	most conservative



*B: Opinions on the role of state*

In the (B) group, which comprises 59 % of all letters to the *Star* editor (48 letters), a full 38 report varying degrees of support for the maintenance of law and order in society through the power of the army and the police. Most were encouraging the use of the army to catch the terrorists, others were fearing more terrorism if the government were to give in to demands, and five letters were calling for maximum penalty for political kidnappers. These cries for law and order all belong to the sub-group B4, at the conservative end of the group's range. This break with the editorial stance of the *Star*,




which did not promote this opinion, is partly due to the fact that many of these letters are one- or two-sentence statements which created a higher volume of letters in the allotted space. Sometimes found in the *Star* were pages of photos and captions under the heading "The People Say", featuring one-line comments on the crisis. These were not included in the count, but it should be mentioned that the opinions were often in favour of strong law enforcement. This high volume of letters calling for law and order is understandable in light of the natural human response of desiring security in the face of danger.

Other letters were more liberal in opinion, such as the six insisting that the state must negotiate for the safety of the hostages (B1), and the four letters about avoiding the use of too much force (B2).

**FIGURE 10 : The Star**

B01 : 6    **most liberal**  
B02 : 4  
 B03 : 0  
 B04 : 28    **most conservative**



*C: Opinions on the crisis roots and response*

A total of three letters from each newspaper were written to express opinion on the roots of the crisis. All three Toronto letters, which means 4 % of the total number of letters, pointed to social and economic injustices as the cause of the crisis (C2). As the letters of this direction group accounted for but a small portion of the public opinion, a graph is not considered necessary.

Letters: *La Presse*

As in the Toronto newspaper, the letters of *La Presse* follow the general pattern of political leaning set by the editorials. A significantly weightier show of conservative opinion is present in the French letters to the editor. In *La Presse*, more interest was expressed in democracy (A) (56 % of total number of letters) than in the role of the state (B) (34 %). Only 10 % of the letter contribution was on the subject of crisis roots and response (C). For comparison, the following Figure combines Figure 8 with *La Presse* percentages.

<b>FIGURE 11 : The Star</b>	30 letters in A group = 37%	<b>La Presse</b>	18 in A group = 56%
	48 letters in B group = 59%		11 in B group = 34%
	3 letters in C group = 3%		3 in C group = 10%


*A: Opinions on democracy*

Only one letter, compared to the 14 in the *Star*, touched on the issue of civil rights, which was surprising given the arrests disrupting lives in Montreal and the restrictions on behaviour, speech and company after the invocation of the War Measures Act. It is possible that editing was a factor in this surprising lack of protest; choice of material to go to print is a powerful tool for the agenda-setting editor.

Most themes of the 18 letters in Group A were categorized at the other end of the spectrum : namely A5, or anti-terrorism (3 letters), A6, support for elected authority (5 letters), and A7, approval for the suspension of individual liberties (4 letters). The graph illustrates the lean towards conservatism.

**FIGURE 12 : La Presse**

A1 : 1	<b>most liberal</b>
A2 : 3	
A3 : 1	
A4 : 1	
A5 : 3	
A6 : 5	
A7 : 4	<b>most conservative</b>




*B: Opinions on the role of state*

The Montreal letters in Group B also repeat the trend towards conservatism set by the paper's editorials, with the largest concentration of themes in B4 (6 of the 11 letters) : belief that the state's role is to protect law and order through the power of the army and the police. Two letters each supported more liberal themes of B1 and B2 : the importance of negotiations for lives, and the need to avoid excessive force. Whether due to the reality of living in such an environment as Montreal in October 1970, or due to editing, or a combination, the weight is again towards the conservative extreme of the spectrum.

**FIGURE 13 : La Presse**

B01 : 2 **most liberal**  
B02 : 2  
 B03 : 1  
 B04 : 6 **most conservative**



*C: Opinions on the crisis roots and response*

Like the *Toronto Daily Star*, only three letters expressed opinion in this direction group. The three Montreal letters were divided between C1, the view that government used the events of the crisis to halt Quebec nationalism; C2, roots of social and economic injustice; and C3, belief that the government had no alternative but to respond to the threat with the invocation of the War Measures Act. The comparison value of this group is small, gaining interest as the debates progress into the months of November and December, beyond the scope of this study.

Special opinion pieces: *The Toronto Daily Star*

In the month of October 1970, the *Toronto Star* published 15 opinion articles written by people other than journalists or editorialists. Professors of History, International Relations, Urbanism, Politics and French/English studies from various Canadian universities stated opinion, as did well known figures such as Jeanne Sauvé and communications expert Marshall McLuhan. Of the 15 special opinion contributions, 40 % spoke on democracy (A), 27 % on the role of state (B), and 33 % looked at the "why" of the FLQ crisis.

**FIGURE 14 : The Star**

6 opinion pieces in A group = 40%

4 opinion pieces in B group = 27%

5 opinion pieces in C group = 33%

*A: Opinions on democracy*

The six articles, or 40 %, that observed democracy in Canada were all written by university professors of different specialities, and were diverse in content. The liberal extreme of putting human rights above all other issues was represented (A1), as was the more conservative view of maintaining the social contract and believing in elected leaders (A5, A6). Common secondary themes were that the government must be responsible and justify its decisions (A2) and that the state must avoid excessive use of force (B2).

**FIGURE 15 : The Star**A1 : 2     **most liberal**


A2 : 0

A3 : 0

A4 : 1

A5 : 1

A6 : 2


A7 : 0     **most conservative**

*B: Opinions on the role of state*

Four special opinion pieces fell into Group B, 27 % of the total amount of outside contribution. Of these four, two decisively underlined the need for a stronger show of force, police and military, in a time of crisis to ensure the maintenance of law and order (B4). As there is a show of firm conservatism in all three direction groups from outside sources, it may be hypothesized that printing these opinions were considered a method of balancing political opinion in the newspaper, while still holding true to editorial stance.

**FIGURE 16 : The Star**

B01 :	0	most liberal
B02 :	1	
B03 :	1	
B04 :	4	most conservative



*C: Opinions on the crisis roots and response*

History professors and outside press figures showed interest in the reasons behind the crisis, contributing five pieces that belong to Group C, or 33 % of the total. Again, hard-lined conservatism appears in the two articles exclaiming that FLQ terrorists are an extension of the separatist movement, which is at the root of the upheaval and must be suspected and resisted in its entirety (C5). Social and economic injustices are discussed in

two other opinion articles as being the cause of the political unrest and the acts of terrorism (C2). The government's part in augmenting the crisis with its response was defended in another piece due to the threat of "apprehended" insurrection (C3).

**FIGURE 17 : The Star**


C01 : 0    **most liberal**

C02 : 2

C03 : 1

C04 : 0

C05 : 2    **most conservative**



#### Special opinion pieces: *La Presse*

In the French-language daily, only two outside opinion articles were found for the month of October. As discussed above, the reason for this could be the draw of the newspaper *Le Devoir* as a place of discussion and expression for the intellectuals and experts. Another possibility could be that the letter pages of *La Presse* print long, detailed arguments, some of which are signed by professors. Others may belong to unidentified experts and scholars. As the case may be, the two contributions found belong equally to the A and the B group. One expresses the opinion that the state must not use excessive force (B2), and must allow those arrested under the War Measures Act basic human rights, such as contact with family and the right to trial (A1 secondary theme). The other



states that terrorist methods of reform are unacceptable in a democracy, and that the public must express dissent by means of electoral process (A5).

## CONCLUSION

The most immediate and surprising result of this project was that the findings were a direct reversal of those expected. The study was undertaken in the belief that it would prove a stronger show of support in the Montreal newspaper for the protection of civil rights, and a harder line in the Toronto paper for tough government and all the force necessary to resolve the crisis. The reasons for the expectations were multiple. Firstly, the restrictions of the War Measures Act and the numerous arrests of Montreal citizens was a far greater threat to the human rights of those living in Montreal than in a city separated by 400 kilometres and not considered to be hiding an undetermined number of dangerous terrorists. There was no immediately noticeable restriction of individual liberties in the city of Toronto as was the case in Montreal.

Another reason for the hypothesized findings was the perhaps misguided belief that Toronto citizens were more supportive in general of federalism and of the federal government of Trudeau. Other preconceived ideas possibly helped fashion the original expectations of findings. For example, the idea of Toronto harbouring some disdain for Quebec nationalism, and Montreal sympathizing in part with the FLQ'S desire for the "liberation" of Quebec - this notion could have led to the belief that the Toronto paper would demand more loudly for FLQ capture and punishment through a strong show of governmental power.

However, the principal reason for expecting results other than the ones found lies in the reading of the comprehensive overview of Canadian newspapers conducted by Arthur Siegel in 1974. He concluded that English newspapers were more "hostile to terrorism generally and the FLQ specifically", provided far stronger support for both the federal and provincial governments, enthusiastically upheld the decision to invoke the War Measures Act and consistently supported Canadian unity. For the French-language papers, editorialists provided "extremely strong support" for negotiations, comparatively small concern for Canadian unity, a distinction between separatism and terrorism, and a frequent emphasis of social and economic injustices. Siegel held that French papers were far more concerned about what was happening to civil rights in Canada<sup>1</sup>.

Reading the data for the present study, it was quickly understood that the two chosen dailies, though included in the earlier overview, deviated from the pattern established for Canadian news coverage of the FLQ crisis. Siegel did record a lessening of the French/English pattern of difference for these two most popular newspapers in the two most important metropolises of the country, and suggested a similarity of content and attitude. Approached from the angle of specific opinion on democracy instead of exhaustive reporting on all aspects of the crisis, analysis of these two dailies reveals not just a lessening of extremes, but a trend in the opposite direction.

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<sup>1</sup> Arthur Siegel, *Canadian Newspaper Coverage of the FLQ Crisis : A Study on the Impact of the Press on Politics*, p. 229-230.

The results suggest that *La Presse* had a much more conservative vision of democracy in Canada during this month of coverage than did *The Toronto Star*. Toronto opinion focused more heavily on importance of civil rights and political freedom than those in *La Presse*, and the attitude was often critical of governmental action. The democratic principle of political freedom was of prime importance in the *Star*, and the suspension of individual liberties and rights was deemed an unacceptable way for a democratic government to respond to a threat. The *Star* editorials more often address the theme of democracy than the role of state; in both direction groups, the stance is more liberal than that of *La Presse*.

*La Presse* editorials and letters more often stressed the importance of the protection of the majority, even if it meant the temporary suspension of individual liberties. Also recurring was the opinion that elected representatives were to be supported and the democratic social contract respected. Terrorist methods of reform were considered to be totally unacceptable, and Montreal contributors often emphasized that living in a democracy means expressing dissent by means of electoral process.

When looking at opinions on the role of state, it is evident that editorials of *The Toronto Star* recognized a democratic state as one which is first and foremost protector of individual rights and liberties. Prioritizing negotiations for the safety of the hostages was often encouraged of the government. Also liberal in position were the Toronto editorials criticizing the overuse of force and the misuse of the War Measures Act in a

time of peace. In all types of opinion articles, the governments were called to task to justify their actions. Compared to *La Presse*, editorials in the *Star* less often brought up the issue of role of state; when they did, they were more liberal in position. Letters to the *Star* editor revealed a break with the editorial stance : insistent demands for law and order showed them to be strongly conservative.

In *La Presse*, editorials viewed a democratic state more conservatively as enforcer of law and order, even if it meant recourse to "legitimate" violence. The police and army were viewed as necessary protection for democracy, which was threatened by the attempted revolution of the political order. Warnings against concession to FLQ demands appeared often, as it was considered weakness on the part of the state, and potential encouragement to further terrorism. Relative to the contributing public of the *Star*, the readers of *La Presse* took more interest in the question of democracy than the issue of the role of state. The opinions the readers expressed on the role of state were along the same conservative lines as *La Presse* editorials.

It is evident that the *Star* editorialists overall maintain a more liberal position than their readers, while *La Presse* editorialists have more conservative opinions than their public. The fact that opinion swings generally in the same direction, however, is important. It is argued here that along with editorial selection of letters to go to print, the agenda-setting function of the press is responsible for this link in public and editorial opinion. Not only are readers influenced by what they read in the editorial pages, but they

are exposed to the issues and information considered important by the editor, whose agenda is reinforced by large headlines and front page features. This study's results from the front page news stories also showed a link to editorial attitude.

The idea that *La Presse* is a more conservative newspaper than *The Toronto Daily Star* cannot be confirmed with this information, though certain factors outside the study give reason to this finding, at least for the period studied. For example, given the distance of the city of Toronto from the crisis events, it would have been much easier for the *Star* to express challenging opinion. Though the War Measures Act restricted the sources of news information and applied indirect control to contain the panic, Toronto editorialists were still free to express criticism of government action. The fear experienced by people in Montreal would not have affected their attitude.

Another possible factor of explanation is that *La Presse* is a newspaper close to the reigning powers. Strong support for the Bourassa government to settle the crisis situation permeated the news coverage. Of federalist stance, and in favour of the maintenance of order, the editors and others who help shape the contents of this Montreal paper likely made a consolidated effort to slant conservatively. In contrast to the results of *La Presse*, an independently owned newspaper of Montreal, *Le Devoir*, displayed their stories of negotiations on the front page 100 % of the time, and emphasized this subject more than all others in the editorial pages. *Le Devoir* was much more critical of the government, wrote of the question of a parallel government to replace the one of Robert

Bourrassa for the duration of the crisis ( a subject avoided by *La Presse* ), and expressed a great amount of concern about civil rights in editorial opinion. Not often mentioned were the news themes of manhunt and police activity.

The independent *Le Devoir* could be partly responsible for the conservative results of our Montreal sample newspaper in another way. Daniel Latouche once described *Le Devoir* as a focal point in the distribution of information on the FLQ crisis among intellectuals, technocrats and public figures both in and out of government<sup>2</sup>. If a great majority of outside contribution was being printed in this independent daily, it could account for the small show of criticism for the government in *La Presse*, in addition to the paper's close ties to governing power.

It is argued here that because of the agenda-setting function of the press, the opinions on democracy highlighted by each newspaper at this time influenced their respective readers' view of Canadian democracy. It is also argued that although the media at this time became more important than usual in their influence on political opinions, the results are nevertheless revelatory of basic characteristics of the respective newspapers. It is put forward that the editorial stance on democracy influenced readers of both newspapers in small and significant ways, before, during and after the crisis. If agenda-setting does in fact play such a large role in the forming of political opinion, it becomes apparent that society needs to protect itself from a concentration of media

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<sup>2</sup> Daniel Latouche, "Mass Media and Communications in a Canadian Political Crisis", *op. cit.*, p. 302.

ownership powerful enough to control editorializing across the country, destroying alternative voices.

Other studies have observed the influence of media on public opinion; that is not our purpose here. Nor is it our purpose to use different media influences to explain social or political division. It is enough for this study to conclude that readers of the large metropolitan dailies *La Presse* and *The Toronto Daily Star* received different accounts of the FLQ crisis. Variations in theme emphasis, different front page coverage, and different editorial interpretation were observed after comparison of coverage of this significant event in Canada's history. The findings suggest that a similar comparison of another event would produce the same result : two interpretations of the same subject reaching and influencing two separate audiences.



## APPENDIX A

### *Categories of Opinion Themes*

<b>A1</b>	The maintenance of civil rights is imperative, even in a time of crisis.	<p><b><u>A1.1</u></b> A country is no longer free when there is no freedom of speech and thought.</p> <p><b><u>A1.2</u></b> Overwhelming popular support for the War Measures Act is alarming; Canadians' respect for civil liberties has been eroded by overuse of government power.</p> <p><b><u>A1.3</u></b> The population must resist the impulse to accept restrictions of basic liberties on the ground of necessity.</p> <p><b><u>A1.4</u></b> The government risks violating the same rights it is striving to protect by implementing the War Measures Act.</p> <p><b><u>A1.5</u></b> Freedom of the press must continue in time of crisis.</p> <p><b><u>A1.6</u></b> The suspension of liberties is a dangerous government act and should be reversed as soon as the situation is under control.</p>
<b>A2</b>	Government must be responsible and justify its decisions.	<p><b><u>A2.1</u></b> The government must clearly establish the need for the drastic measures it has taken in order to maintain public confidence in democratic institutions.</p> <p><b><u>A2.2</u></b> The government must compensate for damages to innocent individuals incurred through unjust arrest.</p>

<b>A3</b>	Continual open dialogue is necessary in a pluralistic society.	<p><b>A3.1</b> Government must encourage and be responsive to the free expression of criticism from its constituents.</p> <p><b>A3.2</b> The Canadian experiment of two cultures has suffered but not failed; reaffirmed dedication to a united Canada can keep it alive.</p>
<b>A4</b>	A democratic government must continually work towards social and economic equality.	<p><b>A4.1</b> The governments must take the economic risks necessary to combat unemployment in Quebec, or many citizens will adopt extremist, revolutionary solutions.</p> <p><b>A4.2</b> Citizens in opposition will either express dissent legally or revolt; government should therefore work on eliminating all reasons for revolt.</p> <p><b>A4.3</b> Social reform and correction of injustices is imperative to avoid further tragedy.</p>
<b>A5</b>	The expression of dissent must be by means of electoral process.	<p><b>A5.1</b> Terrorist methods of reform are unacceptable in a democracy.</p> <p><b>A5.2</b> The guarantee of the individual's security is not in the power of violence but in the strength of our democratic institutions.</p> <p><b>A5.3</b> A distinction must be observed between legitimate political groups and terrorist movements.</p>
<b>A6</b>	Canadians must maintain faith in democracy and fulfil their role in the democratic social contract.	<p><b>A6.1</b> Canadians must participate in their democratic society by electing a government that responds to their needs and by respecting the law in return for the state's leadership and protection.</p> <p><b>A6.2</b> Citizens need to recognize democratic authority by supporting elected leaders.</p> <p><b>A6.3</b> Expressions of support for government action are critical to the survival of democracy.</p>

<b>A7</b>	The suspension of some civil rights is acceptable in a time of crisis.	<p><b><u>A7.1</u></b> Civil rights temporarily suspended is preferable to anarchy or to the possibility of a revolutionary non-elected regime.</p> <p><b><u>A7.2</u></b> The average Canadian citizen has suffered no harm because of the War Measures Act and enjoys the same freedom as before.</p>
<b>B1</b>	It is the responsibility of the state to negotiate for the lives of the hostages.	<p><b><u>B1.1</u></b> The hostages' release and safe return must be the prime motivation of the governments and police.</p> <p><b><u>B1.2</u></b> The government should negotiate a reduced ransom, meet the kidnappers' demands, and then obliterate the terrorist movement.</p> <p><b><u>B1.3</u></b> The government should arrange for the exile of the terrorist to Cuba with no possibility of return, in exchange for the hostages.</p>
<b>B2</b>	The state must avoid excessive use of force.	<p><b><u>B2.1</u></b> The FLQ had to be crushed, but without abrogating all civil liberties of innocent Canadians.</p> <p><b><u>B2.2</u></b> The strategy of answering violence with equally brutal courage of authority should not apply to a situation where lives are at stake.</p> <p><b><u>B2.3</u></b> The new legislation replacing the War Measures Act should target unlawful groups only and not the rights of the law-abiding citizen.</p> <p><b><u>B2.4</u></b> The government of this democratic society must allow contact with and information about those arrested under the War Measures Act.</p>

<b>B3</b>	Government officials and the media have a responsibility to control the climate of panic.	<p><b><u>B3.1</u></b> Violence feeds on violence, and the less that is reported by the media, the calmer the public reaction will be.</p> <p><b><u>B3.2</u></b> Political leaders would do more good for society by working toward solutions for its problems rather than making reactionary declarations.</p> <p><b><u>B3.3</u></b> The media and the intellectuals must take care to speak reasonably and positively of the issues brought about by the Quebec crisis, for too much negative slant will create a false image of society.</p>
<b>B4</b>	It is the responsibility of the state to maintain law and order by the exercise of "legitimate" violence.	<p><b><u>B4.1</u></b> Justice and order are in jeopardy; deliverance and protection must come through the power of the army and the police.</p> <p><b><u>B4.2</u></b> Provincial and municipal police forces must show greater force in time of crisis.</p> <p><b><u>B4.3</u></b> The state must refuse to negotiate with the terrorists, for giving in to their demands would encourage more terrorism in the future.</p> <p><b><u>B4.4</u></b> Political kidnappers should receive maximum penalty under the law.</p> <p><b><u>B4.5</u></b> The state should respond to execution of a hostage with execution of FLQ members in custody.</p>
<b>C1</b>	The government used the political kidnappings and the suspension of liberties to halt Quebec nationalism.	

<b>C2</b>	The crisis arises from social and economic inequality.	<p><b>C2.1</b> The October crisis necessitates an analysis of the social and economic conditions from which it arises.</p> <p><b>C2.2</b> Steps towards a special status for Quebec should be taken in the near future.</p> <p><b>C2.3</b> The violence demanding change should not be interpreted as an English-French confrontation : economic inequality exists also between classes in Quebec society.</p> <p><b>C2.4</b> Addressing the problem of poverty and unemployment in Quebec at an earlier stage would have averted the crisis.</p>
<b>C3</b>	The government had no alternative but to invoke the War Measures Act given the circumstances of the crisis.	<p><b>C3.1</b> The Criminal Code was insufficient to deal with the FLQ terrorism, and no specific, appropriate legislation existed.</p> <p><b>C3.2</b> The government feared an "apprehended" insurrection and acted to protect democracy.</p> <p><b>C3.3</b> The authorities in power were acting in response to a plan of "provisional government" designed to replace the Bourassa government.</p> <p><b>C3.4</b> The army was called in because the Quebec police force was too weak and unorganized to deal with the crisis.</p>
<b>C4</b>	Democracy is not deep-rooted in Quebec and drastic action was necessary.	
<b>C5</b>	FLQ terrorists are an extension of the separatist movement, which must be suspected and resisted in its entirety.	

## APPENDIX B

### *Chronology of Major Crisis Developments*

#### Monday, October 5th

- Four armed men kidnapped James Richard Cross.
- Police (Montreal, Quebec Provincial and R.C.M.P.) began manhunt.
- FLQ ransom message found at University of Quebec (Montreal) after anonymous telephone call to French-language radio station CKLM.
- Quebec Minister of Justice, Jérôme Choquette, made public statement outlining ransom demands.
- Mrs. Cross issued appeal to kidnappers to consider her husband's health.
- Quebec cabinet held emergency meeting.
- Movement for the Defence of Political Prisoners, an organization that had been raising funds and seeking release of persons convicted of accused of so-called terrorist crimes, called press conference. Robert Lemieux, a lawyer who had represented FLQ members before the Quebec government had granted the amnesty for "political prisoners" he had asked for six months earlier.

#### Tuesday, October 6th

- Police manhunt intensified.
- Lawyer Lemieux said some of jailed terrorists had signed document accepting asylum in Cuba or Algeria.
- Federal cabinet met to discuss kidnapping.
- Minister for External Affairs, Mitchell Sharp, told House of Commons that ransom demands were "wholly unreasonable" and that this set of demands would not be met.
- Following Quebec cabinet meeting, Premier announced decision to go ahead with previously scheduled visit to New York on Thursday and Friday to encourage investment in the province.
- Premier Bourassa approved Ottawa's stand on the ransom demands.
- Montreal French-language radio station CKAC received a note from FLQ which said Mr. Cross would be executed by 8:30 a.m. Wednesday if ransom demands were not met. CKAC also received a letter from Mr. Cross to his wife.

### Wednesday, October 7th

- Police arrested 30 in pre-dawn raids on known and suspected FLQ haunts.
- 8:30 a.m. deadline passed without word from kidnappers.
- Station CKLM received note extending deadline to noon October 8th. Later in the day, another note was found extending dateline even further -- to midnight October 8th.
- Mr. Lemieux asked the Federal Government to name a negotiator.
- Mr. Sharp gave late evening news conference at which he asked kidnappers to name a mediator.

### Thursday, October 8th

- Medical specialists in Quebec province began a general strike at 8 a.m. in a dispute with the provincial government over Medicare, creating a serious situation that overlapped with the FLQ developments.
- Premier Bourassa left for New York on investment-seeking visit.
- At 10:30 p.m. one of the seven ransom demands of the FLQ was met when the French-network of the CBC broadcast the complete manifesto of the FLQ.
- Midnight deadline for the execution of Mr. Cross passed without further word from the kidnappers.

### Friday, October 9th

- Quebec Justice Minister asked for a letter in Mr. Cross' handwriting to prove he was alive.
- *Le Devoir* editorial, signed by Claude Ryan, said a number of jailed terrorists might be released to save Mr. Cross' life.
- Kidnappers issued "last" communiqué setting 6 p.m. October 10th deadline for government to meet their demands.
- A letter in Mr. Cross' handwriting accompanied communiqué.
- Police revealed the identity of a suspect in the kidnapping: Jacques Lanctôt, a former teacher who became a taxi driver.

### Saturday, October 10th

- Premier Bourassa returned to Quebec province from New York visit.
- Quebec Justice minister consulted with Quebec cabinet and Federal government about statement to be made before 6 p.m. deadline.
- At 5:30 p.m. Mr. Choquette made live television and radio statement that the demands of kidnappers would not be met. However, Mr. Choquette said kidnappers would be

given safe conduct out of Canada if they released Mr. Cross. The Justice minister also promised clemency towards the so-called political prisoners and the kidnappers themselves if they decided to remain in Canada.

- At 6:18 p.m., Mr. Pierre Laporte, the Quebec Minister of Labour and Immigration, was kidnapped from in front of his home by men with sub-machine guns.
- Police set up roadblocks and province-wide alert was issued.
- Quebec provincial police assigned guards to the homes of all cabinet ministers and other public officials who might become kidnap victims.
- A note from a group calling itself the Front de Justice du Quebec threatened reprisals against terrorists and members of their families if any hostages were executed by the kidnappers.

#### Sunday, October 11th

- Communiqué from Laporte kidnappers found after anonymous telephone call to station CKAC. It set a 10 p.m. October 11th deadline for meeting the remaining six FLQ demands or Mr. Laporte would be executed. There was also a letter from Mr. Laporte to his wife.
- Quebec cabinet met with senior Montreal city council officials.
- Police raided homes and offices of suspected FLQ supporters.
- CKAC reporters found a second communiqué that renewed ransom demands. It said the Laporte abductors had not heard from the Cross kidnappers, but if Mr. Cross were still alive, his captors should issue another communiqué.
- A letter from Mr. Laporte to Premier Bourassa called on the Quebec premier to save his life. The letter referred to Mr. Laporte's position as the last adult male in his family who had responsibility of looking after his children and those of his late brother.
- Premier Bourassa conferred with his cabinet, consulted with the Federal government and held discussions with leaders of the opposition parties in the Quebec National Assembly.
- A few minutes before 10 p.m. execution deadline set for Mr. Laporte, Premier Bourassa read a statement that called on kidnappers to contact the government to discuss mechanisms to ensure that liberation of prisoners would, in fact, result in the safety of the hostages.
- Mr. Lemieux arrested and charged with obstructing justice.
- Federal government issued statement in Ottawa announcing concurrence with Premier Bourassa's statement that the main interest was the safe return of Mr. Laporte and Mr. Cross.
- Municipal and Quebec provincial police departments reported they were receiving numerous demands for protection.
- A civic opposition group in Montreal called FRAP (Front d'Action Politique) declared its support for the objectives and ideology of the FLQ, while disavowing terrorist tactics.



Monday, October 12th (Thanksgiving Day)

- In early morning hours, station CKLM broadcast that Mr. Cross was still alive. A letter from Mr. Cross and a communiqué were found in a phone booth after an anonymous phone call. The message repeated demands for release of "political prisoners" and their transfer to Cuba or Algeria; a halt to police activities. It also stated that Robert Lemieux should serve as intermediary between the two FLQ cells that had carried out kidnappings and the authorities.
- Troops left Camp Petawawa (115 miles west of Ottawa) for Federal capital by air and road.
- Premier Bourassa, now staying at well guarded Queen Elizabeth Hotel in downtown Montreal, named Robert Demers, a corporate lawyer and the treasurer of the Quebec Liberal Party, as the government's representative in the negotiations with the FLQ. Mr. Demers and Mr. Lemieux held their first meeting at Montreal police headquarters where Mr. Lemieux was still being held.
- Large convoys of troops were seen moving towards Montreal.

Tuesday, October 13th

- Troops guarding political figures in Ottawa followed them right into Parliament buildings. At the request of MPs troops left Parliament buildings.
- Mr. Lemieux arraigned in court, released on his own recognizance, and had his preliminary hearing set for October 16th.
- Negotiations took place between Mr. Demers and Mr. Lemieux.
- Former Lapalme employees, who had lost jobs because of postal reorganization, and whose reinstatement was one of ransom demands, demonstrated on Parliament Hill in Ottawa.
- René Levesque, leader of separatist Parti québécois, in his daily newspaper column, said the authorities should meet demands made by kidnappers in order to save the lives of the hostages.
- Further round of negotiations between Mr. Demers and Mr. Lemieux. Mr. Demers reported to Quebec cabinet and held more discussions with Mr. Lemieux.
- Mr. Lemieux told a late night news conference at Nelson Hotel, where he lived, that his mandate was over and charged that the government had refused to meet the FLQ demands.
- In Ottawa, Prime Minister Trudeau said the government must use every means at its disposal to prevent establishment of a parallel force in government.

Wednesday, October 14th

- Mr. Lemieux refused to hold further negotiations with Mr. Demers until he received new instructions from FLQ.
- After an anonymous phone call to station CKLM, a communiqué from the FLQ was found which gave carte blanche to Mr. Lemieux as negotiator for the cell holding Mr. Cross and the cell holding Mr. Laporte. The communiqué insisted that all the FLQ demands must be met.
- Ontario Premier John Robarts said that Quebec kidnapping situation was "total war" and the time had come to stand and fight. He declared there could be no compromise with terrorists.
- Premier Bourassa announce that Quebec Nation Assembly would meet on October 15th in emergency session to deal with strike by medical specialists. Ten Canadian Armed Forces signalmen moved into office adjacent to Premier Bourassa's own office in National Assembly Building.
- Ten prominent Quebecers, including Parti québécois leader, René Lévesque and *Le Devoir* publisher, Claude Ryan, issued statement requesting government to go through with release of 23 convicted and accused terrorists, the so-called political prisoners. The statement also referred to Premier Robart's comments earlier in the day and told the Ontario premier to stay out of Quebec's problems.

Thursday, October 15th

- Quebec cabinet met in Quebec City.
- Premier Bourassa announced that he had asked for armed forces to assure safety of the people and public buildings in Montreal.
- Within 30 minutes of Mr. Bourassa's request, about 1,000 officers and men from the Royal 22nd Regiment of the Canadian Army arrived in Montreal.
- Prime Minister Trudeau told House of Commons that he was postponing his trip to the Soviet Union, which was to have started October 19th.
- Quebec National Assembly met to consider special legislation to force striking medical specialists back to work.
- Mr. Lemieux told press conference that the authorities had used negotiations only as a ploy to gain time.
- Quebec government announced willingness to recommend release on parole of five eligible convicted terrorists from the list of the "23 political prisoners" demanded by the FLQ. Safe conduct offered for kidnappers.
- Students held rally in Montreal in support of the terrorists.

### Friday, October 16th

- Cabinet in Ottawa approved proclamation of War Measures Act at 4 a.m.
- Public announcement of War Measures Act proclamation made at 5:15 a.m.
- In many parts of Quebec province, police staged early morning hour raids and arrested 242 people.
- Prime Minister Trudeau tabled in the Commons regulations made under the Act. FLQ outlawed and extraordinary powers of arrest and detention were granted to police.
- Letters tabled in the House of Commons from Premier Bourassa, Montreal Mayor Jean Drapeau and Montreal Executive Committee Chairman Lucien Saulnier officially requesting the imposition of extra police powers.
- Troops from Alberta and New Brunswick moved into Quebec Province to reinforce soldiers already on duty in Montreal and Quebec City.
- Prime Minister Trudeau made television address to nation in which he decried the developments as an attempt by a small group to force its will on the majority by violence.

### Saturday, October 17th

- Mr. Laporte was murdered.
- Anonymous calls to station CKAC led to notes which declared that Mr. Laporte had been executed at 6:18 p.m., exactly one week after his kidnapping. Note included rough map giving directions to where body would be found.
- Premier Bourassa, unaware that Mr. Laporte had already been murdered, appealed for the release of the two hostages and repeated the offer of safe conduct to Cuba for the kidnappers.

### Sunday, October 18th

- Body of Mr. Laporte found in trunk of car in parking lot at St. Hubert Airbase.
- Some radio and television stations broadcast erroneous news that body of Mr. Cross had also been found.
- Commons, which had been sitting in extraordinary Saturday night session, interrupted its debate on the emergency measures when news of the Laporte murder reached the House.
- Leading political figures converged on Parliament Buildings. Prime Minister Trudeau spoke of a "cowardly assassination by a band of murderers."
- Hundreds of persons gathered on Parliament Hill in the early morning hours.
- After anonymous phone call to station CKLM, message from Mr. Cross found.
- Quebec declared three days of official mourning.
- Police issued a nation-wide warrant for the arrest of two suspects in the kidnappings: Paul Rose and Marc Carbonneau.

- Thousands of people filed past the body of Pierre Laporte at the entrance hall of the Criminal Court building on Notre Dame Street.
- Premier Bourassa, in television statement, said Mr. Laporte was a victim of terrifying hatred that Quebecers had not experienced before.
- Prime Minister Trudeau, in late night television statement, warned that FLQ might try again to shake the will of Canada and declared that any such attempt would fail.

#### Monday, October 19th

- Police raided house in St. Hubert where Mr. Laporte had been held captive. Bloodstains matched the blood type of Mr. Laporte. Fingerprints found in house.
- Police raids in province continued and number of persons detained reached 342.
- Pictures and description of Paul Rose and Marc Carbonneau widely circulated.
- In Ottawa, the House of Commons voted overwhelmingly (190-16) to approve the government's proclamation of War Measures Act.
- Federal Government announced that it would introduce new legislation within a month authorizing emergency action of a less drastic nature than War Measures Act.

#### Tuesday, October 20th

- Funeral services held for Mr. Laporte at Notre Dame Church.
- Leaders of all federal parties, and Quebec political parties, federal cabinet ministers, numerous members of House of Commons and Senate, virtually all members of Quebec National Assembly attended funeral. There were representatives from all provinces.
- Intensive security precautions in Montreal on day of funeral.
- In Ottawa, Governor General, diplomats, Supreme Court judges attended memorial service.

#### Wednesday, October 21st

- Coroner Laurin Lapointe made a brief, preliminary autopsy report. Mr. Laporte had been choked to death with a religious chain he wore around his neck.

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